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IF YOU CLIMB INTO BED WITH YOUR BUSINESS PARTNER,
THE COURT MIGHT CLIMB IN, TOO:
THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT’S CAUTIONARY TALE OF
ACRIMONIOUS ENGAGEMENT AND CORPORATE
DEADLOCK IN SHAWE v. ELTING
LAUREN G. DEBONA*
“Naturally, business and pleasure can be readily combined, but a cer-
tain balance should exist, and the latter should not predominate over the
former.”1
I. BREAKING UP, NOT MAKING UP: AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN BUSINESS PARTNERS
It is often said that it is a mistake to mix business and pleasure.2  Yet,
this advice is not always taken.3  Close relationships between professional
partners—whether familial, friendly, or romantic—can blur the line be-
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1. Fredrik Bajer, Nobel Laureate, Nobel Lecture at the Norwegian Nobel In-
stitute: The Organization of the Peace Movement (May 18, 1909) (transcript avail-
able at https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1908/bajer-
lecture.html [https://perma.cc/HM4J-7Y3X]) (“Naturally, business and pleasure
can be readily combined, but a certain balance should exist, and the latter should
not predominate over the former.”).
2. See Chitra Reddy, 11 Reasons Why You Shouldn’t Mix Business with Pleasure,
WISESTEP.COM, https://content.wisestep.com/shouldnt-mix-business-pleasure/
[https://perma.cc/VZY8-QF4M] (last visited June 12, 2018) (highlighting eleven
negative side effects of allowing personal life to interfere with work life); C. Yoder,
Mixing Marriage and Business: The McCourt Divorce, LEGALZOOM.COM (May 2010),
https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/mixing-marriage-business-the-mccourt-di-
vorce [https://perma.cc/NJ6V-MMYN] (providing overview of issues associated
with broken marriages and business).
3. See Reddy, supra note 2 (“According to a recent study conducted by the
University of Illinois, it is found that 60% [sic] people around the globe heavily
mix their office life or business with pleasure through heavy socialization and vari-
ous other means.”); Yoder, supra note 2 (demonstrating what happens when busi-
ness and pleasure mix resulting in damage to business).
(501)
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tween the business and pleasure.4  Although intimate relationships be-
tween business partners have proven successful in a number of
enterprises, such relationships have resulted in business disasters for
many.5  Thus, owners of businesses, both small and large, must be aware of
the volatility of these relationships.6
As circumstances change, affection between intimate business part-
ners can quickly morph into vengefulness and acrimony.7  In the corpo-
rate world, personal strife between directors, executives, or stockholders
can have a devastating impact on the business.8  Most commonly, corpo-
rate dissension and deadlock paralyze efficient management and decision-
making and threaten the business of the corporation with irreparable
injury.9
4. See Jodi Glickman, Stop Mixing Business with Pleasure, HARVARD BUSINESS RE-
VIEW (Mar. 22, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/03/stop-mixing-business-with-plea
.html [https://perma.cc/55H7-2Y7R] (cautioning young business employees
about dangers of mixing work and personal life and stating that business and plea-
sure are not synonymous because lines between them easily blur).
5. See Yoder, supra note 2 (“Mixing marriage and business has proven to be a
formula for success for many Americans—and a recipe for disaster for others.”).
See generally Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 155 (Del. 2017) (demonstrating risks
associated with allowing romantic discord to interfere with business efficiency);
Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 235, 240 (Del. 1982) (demonstrating risks
associated with deteriorating relationships between co-founders and equal fifty
percent stockholders); In re Shawe & Elting LLC, C.A. No. 9661-CB, 2015 WL
4874733, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015) (demonstrating risks associated with
allowing romantic discord to interfere with business efficiency); In re Supreme Oil
Co., Inc., No. 10618-VCL, 2015 WL 2455952, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015) (dem-
onstrating risks associated with allowing familial discord to interfere with business
efficiency); Bentas v. Haseotes, No. Civ. A. 1723-NC, 2003 WL 1711856, at *1–2
(Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003) (emphasizing the consequences of allowing familial dis-
cord to interfere with business operations); Fulk v. Wash. Serv. Assocs., Inc., No.
Civ. A. 17747-NC, 2002 WL 1402273, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002) (demonstrat-
ing risks associated with allowing personal discord between co-owners and former
friends to interfere with business efficiency); Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70,
72–73 (Del. Ch. 2000) (demonstrating risks associated with allowing familial dis-
cord to interfere with business efficiency in closely-held family corporations);
Brown v. Rosenberg, No. 833, 1981 WL 7638, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1981) (Rec-
ognizing “that it is more likely than unlikely that a Court will end up appointing a
receiver to liquidate a corporation where there are but two stockholders, both of
whom own 50% of the corporation’s shares, when they are unable to agree on
anything.”).
6. See Yoder, supra note 2 (“Whether the business is small or large, like a pro-
fessional sports franchise, owners should be aware of the potential pitfalls.”).
7. See id. (explaining that changing circumstances in personal relationships
may lead to harmful relations between business partners, especially in family
businesses).
8. See, e.g., Shawe, 157 A.3d at 155 (finding that personal discontent between
co-owners and co-directors created corporate deadlock that was so severe as to
warrant appointment of custodian to sell solvent corporation); see also Yoder, supra
note 2 (stating that deteriorating relationships may have devastating impact on
business).
9. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226 (West 2010) (acknowledging that court
intervention may be necessary when deadlock threatens “irreparable injury”); see
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When corporate deadlock strikes, however, many states provide statu-
tory remedies.10  Specifically, section 226 of the Delaware General Corpo-
ration Law (DGCL) allows the Court of Chancery to appoint a custodian
for a corporation upon deadlock or for other cause.11  Although the statu-
tory language is relatively clear, the scope of both the court’s and the cus-
todian’s powers under section 226 have become topics of contention.12
The Delaware Supreme Court expounded upon this issue in Shawe v.
Elting.13  In Shawe, the co-owners and board members of a Delaware corpo-
ration developed an increasingly acrimonious and turbulent rapport after
the ruin of their romantic relationship in 1997.14  Since the relationship
ended, they managed to grow the profitable corporation.15  However, un-
satisfied with their financial success, they allowed their “simmering per-
sonal discontent” to infect the corporation’s business affairs, resulting in
paralyzing corporate deadlock.16
Upon petition, the Court of Chancery appointed a custodian under
section 226 and subsequently ordered the custodian to sell the solvent cor-
poration amid the deadlock over the objection of its fifty percent stock-
holders.17  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court considered whether
also GARY LOCKWOOD, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICA-
TION AND INSURANCE § 1:22 (2d ed. 2017) (stating that deadlock can paralyze nor-
mal, established operations of corporations).
10. See RICHARD C. TINNEY, 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 387, §§ 13–24
(1975) (providing overview of various statutory remedies for deadlock, including
involuntary dissolution, appointment of provisional director, and appointment of
custodian or receiver).
11. See § 226 (providing statutory remedy for corporations facing deadlock
and granting Court of Chancery authority to appoint receiver or custodian for
deadlocked corporation).
12. See, e.g., Shawe, 157 A.3d at 152 (considering scope of Court of Chancery’s
authority to appoint custodian and order custodian to sell solvent corporation
under section 226); In re Supreme Oil Co., Inc., No. 10618-VCL, 2015 WL
2455952, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015) (ordering custodian to exercise full extent
of powers under section 226 and to conduct sale for corporation); Fulk v. Wash.
Serv. Assocs., Inc., No. Civ. A. 17747-NC, 2002 WL 1402273 (Del. Ch. June 21,
2002) (considering whether to approve plan for sale of corporation under section
226); Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70 (Del. Ch. 2000) (considering when Court of
Chancery may appoint custodian under section 226 and what powers that custo-
dian exercise).
13. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 155 (holding that Court of Chancery did not exceed
statutory authority under section 226 by appointing custodian and ordering sale of
solvent corporation after less severe means were tried but failed).
14. See id. at 156 (stating Shawe and Elting co-founded corporation, became
engaged in 1996, broke off their engagement in 1997, and that their relationship
became exceedingly tenuous since).
15. See id. (stating that Shawe and Elting grew TransPerfect Global, Inc. to-
gether); id. at 159 (acknowledging that TransPerfect Global “has been a profitable
enterprise”).
16. See id. at 156 (“As the Company grew, the founders were not satisfied with
their financial success, and brought their simmering personal discontent into the
Company’s business affairs.”).
17. See id. at 154 (reiterating holding issued by Court of Chancery).
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the Court of Chancery erred and exceeded its statutory authority under
section 226.18  In a four-to-one decision, the court affirmed the Court of
Chancery’s order to sell the corporation; the court concluded that in cir-
cumstances such as this, when intermediate measures were attempted but
failed, the Court of Chancery properly exercised its discretion to order the
custodian to sell the company and distribute the proceeds to stockholders
of the deadlocked corporation.19
This Casebrief argues that the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in
Shawe was properly decided and consistent with foundational principles of
Delaware corporate law and section 226 jurisprudence—the Shawe deci-
sion serves as an important cautionary tale for Delaware corporations fac-
ing deadlock.20  Ultimately, Shawe signals to Delaware corporations that
the Court of Chancery’s statutory authority to appoint a custodian in the
face of deadlock under section 226, while not unfettered, is rather
broad.21  Part II provides an overview of the relevant background princi-
ples of Delaware corporate law, corporate deadlock, the statutory remedy
provided by section 226, and the cases interpreting its provisions.22  Part
III provides the facts and procedure of Shawe, demonstrating that the case
presents facts and issues similar to those in most corporate deadlock cases,
but also presents more unique, extreme facts that warranted the judicially
ordered sale of the corporation over less drastic means.23  Part III also
outlines the holding and reasoning of the Shawe court.24  Part IV contends
that Shawe was properly decided and discusses its implications for corpora-
tions and their counsel when handling dissension and deadlock.25  Finally,
Part V concludes by emphasizing the importance of Shawe as a cautionary
tale for Delaware corporations and as a reaffirmation of the broad, equita-
ble powers of the Court of Chancery.26
18. See id. at 155 (describing issues presented to court on appeal).
19. See id. (agreeing with Court of Chancery’s conclusion to sell company and
distribute proceeds to deadlocked stockholders).
20. For a discussion of why Shawe was properly decided and why the decision
serves as a cautionary tale for Delaware corporations and their counsel, see infra
notes 154–84 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of why Shawe affirms the broad scope of the court’s equi-
table powers, see infra notes 154–84 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of background principles of corporate law, corporate
deadlock, and statutory deadlock remedies including section 226, see infra notes
27–85 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the facts and procedure of Shawe that demonstrate why
it is both a typical and extreme corporate deadlock case, see infra notes 89–114
and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the Shawe court’s reasoning, see infra notes 115–53 and
accompanying text.
25. For a critical analysis of Shawe and for a discussion of the decision’s sub-
stantive implications for corporations and corporate counsel, see infra notes
154–204 and accompanying text.
26. For a conclusion regarding Shawe’s importance for Delaware corporations
and for Delaware courts, see infra notes 205–10 and accompanying text.
4
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II. ‘TIL DEADLOCK DO US PART: AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE DEADLOCK
AND THE STATUTORY REMEDY PROVIDED BY
SECTION 226 OF THE DGCL
Deadlock exists when factions of the corporation with significant deci-
sion-making power—stockholders or directors—have irreconcilable differ-
ences that hamper corporate operations.27  Deadlock poses many issues
for a corporation and its constituencies, but there are available reme-
dies.28  The equitable powers of the Court of Chancery and basic princi-
ples of Delaware corporate law are important to understanding these
remedies.29  This Casebrief highlights the statutory remedy provided by
section 226 of the DGCL, providing the Court of Chancery with the power
to appoint a custodian for deadlocked corporations.30  The courts that
have interpreted section 226 have affirmed the Court of Chancery’s wide
discretion to determine the most appropriate remedy when deadlock has
escalated to extremes.31
A. Corporate Cupid: The Court of Chancery and Delaware Corporate Law
It is widely recognized that the Court of Chancery has broad, inherent
equitable powers.32  Traditionally, the court has discretion to decide issues
27. See TINNEY, supra note 10, § 3 (noting that corporate deadlock depends on
decision-making powers of disagreeing factions).  Corporate deadlock can only
truly occur when the disagreeing parties have power that can influence corporate
affairs. See id.  This power is usually held by stockholders, directors, or officers that
exercise control either through voting power or through powers derived from the
articles of incorporation or bylaws. See id.  For a discussion of corporate deadlock,
see infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of remedies for corporate deadlock, see infra notes 56–68
and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of foundational principles of Delaware corporate law and
the equitable powers of the Court of Chancery, see infra notes 32–49 and accompa-
nying text.
30. For a discussion of section 226, see infra notes 60–68 and accompanying
text.
31. For a discussion of relevant cases interpreting section 226, see infra notes
69–85 and accompanying text.
32. See Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701,
709, 711 (2011) (stating equity is well-established in Delaware corporate law and
that equity’s “supervening role” has been recognized in Delaware lawmaking); Wil-
liam T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery
– 1792–1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 849 (1993) (noting Court of Chancery’s
power cannot be diminished unless legislation which places the jurisdiction exclu-
sively in another court).
The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized the broad equitable powers of
the Court of Chancery. See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 165, 169 (Del. 2017)
(recognizing that Court of Chancery has broad discretion in fashioning equitable
remedies).  For instance, the Delaware Supreme Court has stated, “The Court of
Chancery’s ‘powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable and monetary
relief as may be appropriate.’” See Kurt M. Heyman & Christal Lint, Recent Develop-
ments in Corporate Law: Recent Supreme Court Reversals and the Role of Equity in Corpo-
rate Jurisprudence, 6 DEL. L. REV. 451, 462 (2003) (quoting Gotham Partners, L.P. v.
Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 176 (Del. 2002)).
5
DeBona: If You Climb Into Bed With Your Business Partner, the Court Might
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
506 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 501
on a situational, case-by-case basis.33  This wide discretion allows the court
to fashion the best remedy for the parties before it, especially when no
adequate remedy is available at law.34  Discretion has proven essential in
the context of corporate law because the court must be able to respond to
the flexible design of the DGCL.35
The Court of Chancery is the primary forum for deciding cases aris-
ing under the DGCL.36  The DGCL is often characterized as a series of
enabling statutes, allowing for “private ordering” by permitting corpora-
tions to waive default benefits of the corporate form when desirable and to
opt in to statutory forms when appropriate.37  The Court of Chancery’s
33. See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 32, at 821–22 (recognizing courts of
equity must be able to respond to specific situations, rather than relying on univer-
sal rules, and noting that emphasis is on individual cases and that particular facts
control).
34. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 713 (recognizing that courts of equity must
be employed when “doing so is necessary for the greater attainment of justice”);
Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 32, at 820 (recognizing that Court of Chancery is
not overly bound by restrictive legal doctrines and that it can adapt to different
factual situations to find relief under the circumstances when no adequate remedy
is available at law).  Commentators note that, when the Court of Chancery was
established under the Delaware state constitution, it was a “guarantee to the peo-
ple of the State that equitable remedies will at all times be available for their pro-
tection.” See id. at 849.  Its equitable powers were not limited by any legislative
provision, but only by the commonly understood principle that “equity does not
act where there is an adequate remedy at law.” See id. at 850.
35. See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 32, at 855 (explaining that equity
mandates jurisprudence be flexible to respond to and expand with social needs).
In order to fashion the best possible remedy, the courts look for guidance to reme-
dies fashioned under other statutes of the DGCL. See, e.g., Shawe, 157 A.3d at 165
(noting Chancellor properly looked for guidance under section 273 to fashion
remedy under section 226).
36. See Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen’s Jurisprudence and the Theory of Corpo-
rate Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 699, 704 (1992) (referring to Court of Chancery
as “the nation’s principal corporate law forum” because it “can respond quickly
and effectively to changing business needs”).
37. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 721, 724 (recognizing that “the legislatively-
enacted corporate statute is ‘permissive, enabling, and expansive in its thrust’” and
that “enabling statutes are necessary to permit waivers in those instances where
they are desirable and knowingly availed of”).  Delaware’s enabling statutes maxi-
mize managerial flexibility. See Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law
of Closely Held Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1099 (1999) (noting that Dela-
ware “maximize[s] managerial flexibility”).  Therefore, it is no surprise that Dela-
ware is the premier domicile for companies that seek to incorporate. See id.
Delaware’s enabling statutes allow for “private ordering.” See id. at n.1 (citing
Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80,
123 n.192 (1991) (“Delaware has fashioned what is predominantly an enabling
statute that accommodates rather than restricts private ordering”)).  The flexibility
of the DGCL permits deviation from traditional features of the corporate form,
such as deviating from board management through provisions in a company’s arti-
cles of incorporation. See Dennis S. Karjala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legisla-
tion in the United States, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 691 (1989) (detailing flexible features
of DGCL’s enabling statutes).  The corporation can include nontraditional fea-
tures, such as supermajority voting, deadlock-breaking devices, and share transfer
6
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equitable powers allow it to respond to private ordering.38  One commen-
tator suggests that judicial intervention is necessary when private ordering
fails.39  Therefore, the DCGL explicitly provides the Court of Chancery
with jurisdiction over matters arising under many of its provisions.40  Even
with statutory jurisdiction, however, the Court of Chancery retains its equi-
table powers.41
The Court of Chancery’s broad equitable powers are balanced by its
hesitation to interfere with corporate governance.42  Nevertheless, the
restrictions. See id.  Enabling statutes, such as those included in the DGCL, allow
incorporators to meet the foreseeable needs and desires of involved parties. See id.
38. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 724 (recognizing that legislatively-enacted
corporate statutes are countered by judicially-imposed duties that constrain mana-
gerial misbehavior that goes too far).
39. See Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Share-Holders’ Reasonable
Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 237–38 (1988) (suggesting that judicial inter-
vention is useful when private ordering proves inadequate).  Thompson suggests
that the role of the judiciary supplements private ordering. See id. at 237.  For
instance, the court’s intervention may be necessary to limit the permanence of
corporate decisions when controlling parties have exercised their discretion in a
way that is contrary to the reasonable expectations of other corporate parties. See
id.
40. See Heyman & Lint, supra note 32, at 479–80 (“The Court of Chancery’s
jurisdiction over most corporate disputes stems from both sources: fiduciary duties
of corporate directors are equitable in nature . . . and many sections of the DGCL
expressly provide for jurisdiction in that court.”); see also Peter B. Ladig & Kyle
Evans Gay, Judicial Dissolution: Are the Courts of the State That Brought You in the Only
Courts That Can Take You Out?, 70 BUS. LAW. 1059, 1076 (2015) (recognizing stat-
utes that “empower” Court of Chancery).
41. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 718–19 (“The judges on the Chancery Court
simply cannot, by blithely referring to such an agreement or the underlying ena-
bling statute, avoid their own continuing responsibility to ask—in every case—
whether, in equity, they should or should not enforce the contractual waiver.”).
Under section 394 of the DGCL, “[t]his chapter and all amendments thereof
shall be a part of the charter or certificate of incorporation of every corporation
except so far as the same are inapplicable and inappropriate to the objects of the
corporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (West 2013).  Thus, Delaware corpora-
tions and their stockholders submit to the statutory equitable authority granted to
the Court of Chancery. See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 163 (Del. 2017) (citing
§ 394 and recognizing that “all corporations agree to make all provisions of the
DGCL part of their charters”).  Stockholders of Delaware corporations are only
entitled to the rights that come with their stock, and those rights, as evidenced by
the incorporation of the DGCL into the company’s articles of incorporation, are
subject to the Court of Chancery’s statutory powers. See id. at 165.  In some in-
stances, statutes, such as those dealing with certain mergers, may require that the
stockholders give up their stock over their objections; thus, when the Court of
Chancery exercises its statutory authority, stockholders may be required to do the
same. See id.
42. See Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Busi-
ness Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 984–85 (1994) (citing Cole v. Nat’l Cash
Credit Ass’n, 156 A. 183, 188 (Del. Ch. 1931)) (discussing Delaware’s reliance on
business judgment rule, through which courts defer to decisions of management,
executives, and directors).  Courts of equity should not be called upon to control
the discretion of the managing bodies of corporations. See id.  Likewise, the Court
of Chancery has expressed its hesitation to “enmesh an outsider and, by extension,
7
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Court of Chancery is inclined to intervene, when it must, to ensure “equity
will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.”43  The court acts when doing so
is necessary to protect the interests of the corporation’s various constituen-
cies—most importantly, its stockholders.44  The interests of the corpora-
tion’s stockholders and employees are particularly important when the
corporation is deadlocked, and the court will favor remedies that further
the interests of these constituents.45
When the Court of Chancery fashions a remedy, its decision is often
given great deference.46  The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized
the Court into matters of internal corporate governance for an extensive period of
time.” See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 160.
A commentator also notes that the Delaware courts should be hesitant to use
equitable principles to override established principles of corporate law, such as the
business judgement rule. See Heyman & Lint, supra note 32, at 484 (quoting Ala-
bama By-Prod. Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.1 (Del. 1991)) (“The invocation
of equitable principles to override established precepts of Delaware corporate law
must be exercised with caution and restraint.  Otherwise, the stability of corporate
law is imperiled.”) (emphasis omitted).  Other commentators recognize Dela-
ware’s “desire to let business decisions be made by the directors and stockholders
of Delaware corporations rather than by the Court.” See Quillen & Hanrahan,
supra note 32, at 864.
43. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 5642, 1985 WL 11546, at *9 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 30, 1985), aff’d sub nom. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1985)
(“Quite simply, equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.”); Shawe, 157 A.3d
at 159 (quoting Weinberger, 1985 WL 11546, at *9).  In Weinberger, the court liberal-
ized appraisal valuation procedures for corporate stockholders. See Ragazzo, supra
note 37, at 1149 (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714).  A commentator suggests that
the decision in Weinberger was pivotal for Delaware courts, indicating that liberal,
equitable remedies are available to protect stockholders in Delaware. See id.
44. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001) (arguing that shareholder primacy is para-
mount and that managers of corporations are obliged to manage the company in
shareholders’ interests, but also recognizing arguments favoring the interests of
other corporate constituencies, namely employees); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should
Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 170 (2008) (recognizing that
courts allow corporate directors to make decisions that harm shareholders for ben-
efit of other corporate constituencies).
45. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 160, 166 (ordering custodian to sell corporation as
remedy for deadlock because doing so was best means to safeguard the company
and recognizing that selling corporation as a going concern was best method of
protecting employees and maximizing value for stockholders); Bentas v. Haseotes,
769 A.2d 70, 79 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating custodian should use best judgement in
deciding what is best for corporation and its stockholders collectively).
46. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 155, 160, 166 (refusing to disturb findings of Court
of Chancery on appeal and deferring to Chancellor’s judgment); Gotham Part-
ners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 175 (Del. 2002) (recog-
nizing that Court of Chancery has wide discretion to fashion remedies and
implying that its discretion deserves great deference); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715
(noting “the broad discretion of the Chancellor to fashion such relief as the facts
of a given case may dictate”); Int’l Telecharge, Inc. v. Bomarko, Inc., 766 A.2d 437,
439 (Del. 2000) (noting that the Delaware Supreme Court “defer[s] substantially
to the discretion of the trial court in determining the proper remedy”); see also
Massey, supra note 36, at 690 (“[E]ven when unappealed, [Delaware Court of
Chancery opinions on corporate law] carry great weight and authority.  This is
8
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that the Chancellor’s “powers are complete to fashion any form of equita-
ble and monetary relief as may be appropriate.”47  Illustrative of this defer-
ence, the Delaware Supreme Court reviews on appeal only questions
raised before the Court of Chancery and will review the Chancellor’s
choice of remedy for abuse of discretion.48  Two commentators even sug-
gest that the Supreme Court is willing to exercise the Court of Chancery’s
equitable discretion itself when it believes the Chancellor erred below.49
B. Mending the Broken Heart: Deadlock and Section 226
Deadlock occurs when “dissension” among directors or stockholders
progresses to a degree that the corporation cannot perform business oper-
ations.50  When one party acts to resolve the problem, that may provoke
counteraction by the other party, and this often results in increased dissen-
due, in no small measure, to their high quality and to the unusually able succes-
sion of chancellors, especially in this century.”).
47. See Heyman & Lint, supra note 32, at 462–63 (quoting Gotham Partners, 817
A.2d at 176) (recognizing Delaware Supreme Court acknowledges broad equitable
powers of Court of Chancery).
48. See Gotham Partners, 817 A.2d at 175 (“This Court reviews the Court of
Chancery’s fashioning of remedies for abuse of discretion.”); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 8
(“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for review;
provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may
consider and determine any question not so presented.”).  The Delaware Supreme
Court considers all arguments that were not raised before the Court of Chancery
to be waived. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 162 (relying on Rule 8 to determine party had
waived his primary argument on appeal).  The court relied the following language:
It is axiomatic that an appellate court will generally not review any issue not raised
in the court below.  This rule is based on the principle that it is fundamentally
unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule correctly on an issue it was never
given the opportunity to consider.  Furthermore, it is unfair to allow a party to
choose to remain silent in the trial court in the face of error, taking a chance on a
favorable outcome, and subsequently assert error on appeal if the outcome in the
trial court is unfavorable.
Id. (quoting 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 618 (2018)).
49. See Heyman & Lint, supra note 32, at 482 (“[I]n holding that Court of
Chancery had abused its discretion in fashioning the remedy it did, not only did
the Supreme Court not reinforce the role of equitable principles, but it arguably
demonstrated that it will exercise the Court of Chancery’s equitable discretion it-
self where it disagrees with the results reached by the Court of Chancery.”).
50. See TINNEY, supra note 10, §§ 2–4 (defining “deadlock,” noting that it ham-
pers carrying on of corporate affairs and distinguishing between director and
stockholder deadlock); see also 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2371 (2018) (stating
that “deadlocked” within the meaning of statutes refers to corporation that cannot
perform its corporate powers because of stockholders’ indecision); Deadlock in a
Close Corporation: A Suggestion for Protecting a Dissident, Co-Equal Shareholder, 1972
DUKE L.J. 653, 654 (1972) [hereinafter Deadlock in a Close Corporation] (defining
deadlock as “an impasse in corporate decisional processes.”).  Corporate dissen-
sion must be distinguished from deadlock. See TINNEY, supra note 10, §§ 2–3 (de-
fining both “dissension” and “deadlock” and distinguishing between the two).
Dissension is commonly regarded as “disagreement in opinion especially partisan
and contentious.”  Dissension exists whenever there is any degree of difference of
opinion among any of the corporation’s officers, directors, or shareholders. See id.
Dissension can exist without deadlock; it is expected that these factions will disa-
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sion as other stockholders, directors, and officers take sides.51  Deadlock
has significant negative impacts, including obstruction of routine business,
detriment to corporate borrowing, and often times, costly litigation.52
While deadlock may affect any corporation, the likelihood of dead-
lock is significantly increased in closely-held corporations, which have only
a few stockholders and are distinguishable from those that are widely
held.53  With fewer stockholders, the likelihood that dissension will esca-
late into deadlock is significantly increased.54  This has been attributed to
the degree of trust, respect, and cooperation required among stockhold-
gree. See id. § 3.  Deadlock, however, is the product of dissension that cannot be
resolved through interaction and compromise. See id.
51. See TINNEY, supra note 10, § 5 (“Any action by one faction to resolve the
problem is likely to provoke counteraction by an opposing faction, with various
shareholders, directors, and officers taking sides, merely adding to the
dissension.”).
52. See TINNEY, supra note 10, § 1 (noting that deadlock has “crippling effect”
on corporations); id. § 5 (including obstruction of routine business matters, ad-
verse effects on corporate credit, and continuous actual or threatened litigation as
crippling); Deadlock in A Close Corporation, supra note 50, at 655 (listing “obstruction
of even routine business matters, deleterious effects on corporate borrowing, and
incessant litigation” as adverse effects of deadlock on the corporation); see also 3
JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 14:11 (3d 2017) (recognizing “heavy impact” on corporation in context of close
corporations).
Deadlock struggles often lead to litigation between opposing factions. See
LOCKWOOD, supra note 9, § 1:22.  Any opposing faction may be justified in either
bringing or defending an action regarding the deadlock in order to protect the
interest of the corporation. See id.  Because deadlock can paralyze corporate oper-
ations, courts may order remedies as extreme as dissolution of the corporation. See
id.  Additionally, litigation in the course of resolving deadlock can be very costly.
See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 142, 152 (Del. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 93 (2017)
(awarding large amount of costs and fees to applicant under section 226).
53. See GREGORY C. SMITH, START-UP & EMERGING COMPANIES: PLANNING, FI-
NANCING & OPERATING THE SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS § 1.08[12] at 64 (Release 12 2003)
(stating that “closely held corporations” are those with few shareholders, as distin-
guished from corporations which are widely or publicly held); TINNEY, supra note
10, § 1 (stating dissension and deadlock is one peculiar to close corporations and
has particularly crippling effect on those organizations).
Courts and commentators have noted deadlock usually occurs in the closely-
held “family” corporation in which each of the two groups vying for control of the
corporation has 50% of the outstanding stock. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 9, § 1:22
(citing Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70 (Del. Ch. 2000)); 16A FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 8066.10 (2017) [hereinafter 16A
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA] (citing Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017)).
The term “closely-held” corporation is an informal term that is used inter-
changeably with the term “close corporation.” See SMITH, supra.  However, “close
corporation” has developed a particular meaning. See id.  A number of states, in-
cluding Delaware, have created a statutory entity called a “close corporation.” See
id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (West 1983)).
54. See TINNEY, supra note 10, § 5 (stating dissension in close corporations is
likely to continue and to become more disruptive).
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ers and to the additional bonds, such as personal relationships, that may
connect stockholders.55
Corporations fail to adequately prepare for deadlock.56  Nevertheless,
there are a number of remedies available, including contractual and non-
statutory equitable remedies.57  While courts have traditionally addressed
the paralyzing effects of deadlock, state legislatures have addressed it as
well by providing statutory remedies.58  Specifically, section 226 of the
DGCL grants the Court of Chancery authority to appoint either a custo-
dian or receiver to resolve deadlock.59
55. See id. (stating that nature of closely held corporations requires high de-
gree of trust, respect, and cooperation among those in control).  Closely held cor-
porations require more intimate relationships among fewer corporate participants.
See Thompson, supra note 39, at 196.  The closely-held corporation often permits
participants to invest both their money and their efforts through employment. See
id.  Stockholders in closely-held corporations expect both employment and a role
in the management of the company. See id.  Importantly, the stockholders in a
close corporation often are bonded through other personal relationships that
combine with their business relationships and influence the corporation. See id.
56. See SMITH, supra note 53, at 14 (recognizing that few businesses engage in
advance planning to resolve or decrease likelihood of deadlock and noting that
optimism at start of business usually obscures belief that deadlock may occur);
Thompson, supra note 39, at 199 (noting that close corporations often fail to ade-
quately plan for deadlock).
57. See TINNEY, supra note 10, § 6 (stating that remedies for dissension and
deadlock fall into three general categories, including contractual remedies, equita-
ble remedies other than those provided by statute, and statutory remedies).  Con-
tractual remedies are those that parties agree to through the corporation’s bylaws,
articles of incorporation, or shareholder agreements. See id. § 7.  They include
buyout arrangements, voluntary dissolution, and arbitration agreements. See id.
§§ 8–11.  Statutory remedies may include involuntary dissolution; appointment of
a custodian, receiver, or provisional director; or purchase of plaintiff’s shares. See
id. §§ 13–22.
58. See 16A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 53 (acknowledging that courts
traditionally have provided relief from deadlock and that state legislature now pro-
vide statutory relief as well); TINNEY, supra note 10, §§ 6, 13–15, 18–24 (cataloging
statutory remedies available to cure deadlock); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226
(West 2010) (providing for appointment of receiver or custodian as deadlock rem-
edy); § 352 (providing for appointment of custodian for statutory close corpora-
tion); cf. § 273 (providing for dissolution of joint venture corporation having two
50% stockholders when “such stockholders shall be unable to agree upon the de-
sirability of discontinuing such joint venture and disposing of the assets used in
such venture”); § 275 (providing for dissolution generally “if it should be deemed
advisable”).
59. See § 226 (allowing appointment of custodian or receiver of corporation
on deadlock or for other cause).  Under the statute,
(a) The Court of Chancery, upon application of any stockholder, may appoint 1
or more persons to be custodians, and, if the corporation is insolvent, to be receiv-
ers, of and for any corporation when:
(1) At any meeting held for the election of directors the stockholders are so di-
vided that they have failed to elect successors to directors whose terms have ex-
pired or would have expired upon qualification of their successors; or
(2) The business of the corporation is suffering or is threatened with irreparable
injury because the directors are so divided respecting the management of the af-
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The Court of Chancery has discretion to appoint one or more per-
sons to be custodians upon application of any stockholder for stockholder
deadlock or director deadlock of the corporation.60  Under section
226(a)(1), the court may appoint a custodian for stockholder deadlock
when the stockholders are so divided that they fail to elect successor direc-
tors.61  Under 226(a)(2), the court may appoint a custodian for director
deadlock when the corporation’s business is suffering or threatened with
fairs of the corporation that the required vote for action by the board of directors
cannot be obtained and the stockholders are unable to terminate this division; or
(3) The corporation has abandoned its business and has failed within a reasona-
ble time to take steps to dissolve, liquidate or distribute its assets.
(b) A custodian appointed under this section shall have all the powers and title of
a receiver appointed under § 291 of this title, but the authority of the custodian is
to continue the business of the corporation and not to liquidate its affairs and
distribute its assets, except when the Court shall otherwise order and except in
cases arising under paragraph (a)(3) of this section or § 352(a)(2) of this title.
Id.  The distinction between receivers and custodians is critical. See R. FRANKLIN
BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 7.56 (2018).  Custodians are appointed for solvent corporations,
but receivers are appointed for insolvent corporations. See id. (citing § 226(a)).
However, the relation between the two is significant because the scope of the cus-
todian’s powers is defined in light of the receiver’s powers. See § 226(b) (stating
custodian has all powers of receiver).
Section 226 has not been amended since 1967. See COX & HAZEN, supra note
52, § 14:15 n.2.  Before it was amended in 1967, it was very difficult to address
deadlocks. See id.  The statute was liberalized in 1967 to overcome this problem.
See id.  Prior to 1967, section 226 did not provide for the appointment of a custo-
dian. See Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 236–37 (Del. 1982).  The “custo-
dian” language was added to enhance the power of the court to remedy deadlock,
but was accompanied by a limitation on the custodian’s powers. See id. at 237, 237
n.10.
60. See § 226(a)(1)–(3) (identifying three conditions that may be met for
court to exercise discretion to appoint receiver, including stockholder deadlock,
director deadlock, and abandonment of corporation).  Appointment of a custo-
dian or receiver under section 226 is not mandatory; it is discretionary. See
BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 59, § 7.56.  Although the decision to appoint a
custodian is within the court’s discretion, its decision may be overturned if the
court abused its discretion by applying an improper standard. See Giuricich, 449
A.2d at 239–40 (applying abuse of discretion standard and finding Court of Chan-
cery abused its discretion by denying petition for appointment of custodian under
section 226).
Particularly important are the provisions regarding stockholder and director
deadlocks. See generally § 226(a)(1)–(2) (providing condition for stockholder
deadlock under section 226(a)(1) and providing condition for director deadlock
under section 226(a)(2)).  Although the statue provides a third condition for
abandonment of the corporation’s business, discussion of that provision is unnec-
essary to this Casebrief’s discussion of Shawe. See generally Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d
152, 160–61 (dealing explicitly with stockholder deadlock and director deadlock
provisions of section 226).
61. See § 226(a)(1) (providing that Court of Chancery may appoint custodian
when there is stockholder deadlock).
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irreparable injury because its directors are so divided that the board can-
not obtain the votes necessary for action.62
The powers of a custodian are defined in section 226(b).63  The cus-
todian has all powers of a receiver under section 291 of the DGCL.64  But,
unless the court orders otherwise or unless another exception is met, the
custodian’s duty is to continue the business of the corporation without
liquidating or distributing its assets.65  Courts have found section 226 clear
and unambiguous, but the custodian’s powers under this provision have
been debated.66  Nevertheless, courts agree that the custodian’s involve-
ment in the corporation’s business should be minimized.67  Courts also
62. See id. § 226(a)(2) (providing that Court of Chancery may appoint a custo-
dian when there is a director deadlock).
63. See id. § 226(b) (defining powers of custodian appointed under section
226).
64. See id. (stating custodian has all powers of receiver under section 291).
Under section 291, a receiver may “take charge of its assets, estate, effects, business
and affairs” and “[may] do all other acts which might be done by the corporation
and which may be necessary or proper.” See id. § 291.  Courts have interpreted
section 291 to permit dissolution of the corporation. See Ladig & Gay, supra note
40, at 1076 n.119.  Because a custodian has all of the powers of a receiver under
section 291, the custodian likely has the power to dissolve a corporation under
section 226. See id. at 1076 n.122.
65. See § 226(b) (stating that custodian should continue business of corpora-
tion, except when court otherwise orders or except in cases under section
226(a)(3) or section 352(a)(2)).  The custodian has the “standby” powers of a re-
ceiver under 291; its default duty is to continue the business of the corporation.
See Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 237 (Del. 1982).  The custodian has
the authority to liquidate the corporation’s affairs or distribute its assets only if the
court so orders. See Bentas v. Haseotoes, No. Civ. A. 17223-NC, 2003 WL 1711856,
at *4 n.13 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003).  The courts have found “liquidation” to in-
clude, “(1) the sale of assets (or subsidiaries); (2) paying off of creditors; (3) other-
wise winding up business affairs, (4) distribution of remaining proceeds to
shareholders; and (5) abandonment of corporate form.” Id.  Nothing in section
226 limits the court to a single structure for choosing to discontinue a venture; the
court could order sale of the company at auction as a going concern or an asset
division. See id. (citing Fulk v. Wash. Serv. Assocs., No. Civ. A. 17747-NC, 2002 WL
1402273, at *10 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002)).
There are three distinct exceptions for when the custodian may deviate from
its duty to continue the business rather than liquidating its affairs or distributing its
assets. See § 226(b).  First, the court may order otherwise. See id.  Second, the cus-
todian may also deviate from its express duty to continue the business of the corpo-
ration in situations arising under section 226(a)(3). See id. §§ 226(b), 226(a)(3).
Finally, the custodian may also deviate from its express duty to continue the busi-
ness of the corporation in situations arising under section 352(a)(2), which pro-
vides for appointment of a custodian for a statutory close corporation. See id.
§ 226(b); see also § 352.
66. See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 164 (Del. 2017) (disputing scope of
section 226(b) but finding that language of section 226(b) is clear and unambigu-
ous); Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 238 (finding that language of section 226(a)(1) is clear
and unambiguous).
67. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 160, 164 (demonstrating reluctance to insert court
into affairs of corporation); Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 240 (recognizing that custodian’s
involvement in corporate affairs should be minimized).
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agree that although the Chancellor may determine the duration and spe-
cific powers of the custodian under sections 226 and 291, those powers
should be limited and exercised only insofar as fairness and justice
require.68
C. Love Lessons: Cases Interpreting Section 226
Cases interpreting section 226 illustrate that the Court of Chancery
has broad discretion to appoint custodians and to determine the duties
custodians must carry out under the statute.69  In Brown v. Rosenberg,70  the
Court of Chancery noted it could order liquidation of the corporation
when two fifty percent stockholders are unable to agree on significant bus-
iness issues.71  One year later, the Delaware Supreme Court issued the pre-
mier decision interpreting section 226, Giuricich v. Emtrol Corporation.72
In Giuricich, the court stated that a custodian’s powers should be lim-
ited.73  It recognized that section 226(b), in conjunction with section 291,
sets forth the maximum statutory limits of the custodian’s powers.74  While
68. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 160, 164 (fearing custodian’s over-involvement in
corporation’s affairs and recognizing that custodian’s powers should be limitedly
exercised as justice requires); Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 240 (stating that court may
determine duration of appointment and specific powers of custodian and that
court’s and custodian’s involvement in corporation’s business and affairs should
be minimized).
69. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 163, 163 n.36 (collecting cases and stating that
Court of Chancery has previously authorized custodian to sell company faced with
stockholder deadlock, which helps confirm Court of Chancery’s broad authority
under section 226).
70. No. 833, 1981 WL 7638, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1981) (stating that ap-
pointment of custodian or receiver under section 226 is within court’s discretion).
71. See id. (“[I]t is more likely than unlikely that a Court will end up ap-
pointing a receiver to liquidate a corporation where there are but two stockhold-
ers, both of whom own 50% of the corporation’s shares, when they are unable to
agree on anything.”).
72. 449 A.2d at 240 (considering whether Court of Chancery abused its dis-
cretion by denying petition for appointment of custodian under section 226).
Plaintiffs owned 50% of the corporation’s stock, while the remaining 50% of the
stock was controlled the corporate defendant. See id. at 235.  Plaintiffs sought re-
structuring of the board of directors to reflect their proportional interest, but the
defendant corporation denied this request. See id.  Plaintiffs filed petition under
section 226. See id.  The Delaware Supreme Court considered whether the Court
of Chancery abused its discretion by denying a petition for the appointment of a
custodian under section 226. See id. at 239–40.  Although appointment is discre-
tionary under section 226, the court abused its discretion in this case because it
denied the petition although the applicant clearly demonstrated that the stock-
holder deadlock satisfied section 226(a)(1). See id. at 240.  Denying the petition
would leave the corporation in perpetual control of the current directors because
of the deadlock, relegating fifty percent owners to minority status without re-
course. See id.
73. See id. (stating powers of custodian should be “sharply limited”).
74. See id. at 240 (finding that section 226(b) sets maximum limits of custo-
dian’s powers, noting that section 291 permits court to determine powers and du-
ration of receiver).
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the Court of Chancery may determine the specific powers of the custo-
dian, the involvement of the court and its custodian in the corporation’s
affairs and business must be kept to a minimum.75  Its powers should be
exercised only insofar as fairness and justice require.76
Since Giuricich, the Court of Chancery has issued multiple decisions
directing custodians appointed under section 226 to sell corporations
when doing so is in the best interest of the corporation and its constituen-
cies.77  For example, the court appointed a custodian for a profitable cor-
poration in Bentas v. Haseotes.78  The court stated that the custodian
should exercise good faith and informed judgment in deciding what is
best for the corporation and its stockholders collectively.79  Consistent
with its equitable powers and broad discretion to craft remedies, the court
approved the custodian’s sale of the corporation.80
The Court of Chancery adopted a similar approach in Fulk v. Washing-
ton Service Associates, Inc.,81 approving a custodian’s plan to sell a corpora-
75. See id. (explaining that under sections 226 and 291, the court may deter-
mine duration of custodian’s appointment and specific powers of custodian and
stating court’s and custodian’s involvement in corporation’s business and affairs
must be kept to minimum).
76. See id. (providing that court’s and custodian’s powers and involvement
should only be exercised to extent that fairness and justice require).
77. See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 160 (Del. 2017) (“[T]he Court of Chan-
cery ‘has appointed custodians to resolve deadlocks involving profitable corpora-
tions and authorized them to conduct a sale of the corporation.’”).
78. 769 A.2d 70, 80 (Del. Ch. 2000) (appointing custodian to resolve dead-
lock involving profitable corporations).  Two of four directors brought action
against holdover directors for appointment of custodian to resolve deadlock of a
profitable corporation. See id. at 73.  The corporation’s board was historically con-
trolled by its four “family directors.” See id.  The stockholders were unable to elect
new directors, and applicants sought appointment of a custodian under section
226(a)(1). See id. at 74.  The defendants argued that the custodian remedy was
“intrusive” and therefore should not be granted for an economically successful
corporation. See id. at 77.  The court rejected this argument. See id. at 78.
79. See id. at 78–79 (interpreting role of custodian).  The court concluded the
custodian shall be totally independent of either deadlocked faction and of the
company. See id.  The role shall be consistent with and limited to the purpose of
assuring the board functions properly. See id.  In order to exercise good faith and
informed judgment, the custodian must be empowered to explore any and all al-
ternatives that might result in a mutually agreed to resolution for the deadlock,
including asset sales and stock sales as a going concern. See id. at 79–80.
80. See Bentas v. Haseotoes, No. Civ. A. 17223 NC, 2003 WL 1711856, at *4
(Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003) (granting custodian’s motion to order auction and sell
corporation and its stock as going concern rather than conducting asset sale).  Af-
ter its previous decision, the court decided whether to grant the custodian’s mo-
tion to conduct an auction for the sale of the corporation or to order an asset sale
as suggested by defendants. See id. at *2, *4.  The court determined that it had the
discretion to order the auction of the company or an asset sale because it has
“broad discretion to craft remedies as justice and equity require.” See id. at *4 n.13.
Concluding it would maximize value for the stockholders, the court ordered the
custodian to conduct an auction. See id. at *4.
81. See Fulk v. Wash. Serv. Assocs., Inc., No. Civ. A.  17747-NC, 2002 WL
1402273, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002) (considering whether to approve custo-
15
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tion as a going concern and with its business intact.82  Most recently, the
Court of Chancery issued order in In re Supreme Oil Company, Incorporated.83
After the parties could not agree to work together toward a consensual
sale of the corporation’s stock, the court ordered the custodian to sell the
company as a going concern, soliciting bids to maximize the amount paya-
ble to stockholders.84  The scope of the custodian’s powers was reexam-
ined by the Delaware Supreme Court in Shawe v. Elting.85
III. WHEN DEADLOCK MAKES THE BED, THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT
ALLOWS A CUSTODIAN TO CLEAN (OR SELL) THE SHEETS
In Shawe, the Delaware Supreme Court considered whether the Court
of Chancery erred by ordering a custodian, appointed under section 226,
to sell a solvent corporation, TransPerfect Global, Inc.86  The court af-
dian’s comprehensive plan of sale that would maximize value for corporation’s
stockholders).  The two fifty percent stockholders of a very profitable corporation,
plaintiff and defendant, became deadlocked. See id. at *1–2. Defendant wanted to
discontinue business with plaintiff or decrease plaintiff’s salary. See id. at *2.  De-
fendant objected to and obstructed every effort and proposal plaintiff made to
ensure the company would be sold at fair market price. See id.
82. See id. at *13–14 (approving custodian’s proposed plan to sell corporation
as going concern with its primary business intact).  The court appointed a custo-
dian, who determined that Defendant’s efforts to frustrate sale of the company at
fair market price, including threats of competition and removal of key employees,
threatened the value of the company. See id. at *4.  The custodian concluded sale
to either of the two stockholders, rather than to a third party, would maximize
value. See id. at *5.  The court concluded it was not limited to one way of discontin-
uing the joint venture, but that it had the flexibility to consider its options. See id.
at *10.
83. No. 10618-VCL, 2015 WL 2455952, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015) (order-
ing custodian to sell profitable company).  The corporation had two controlling
stockholders, each of which was able to elect half of the board of directors. See id.
at *1.  The directors of each respective stockholder had different views regarding
the management of the company, resulting in director deadlock under section
226(a)(2). See id.  Neither the company’s bylaws or charter provided a means of
dealing with the deadlock. See id.
84. See id. at *1–3 (describing court’s order).  The court initially appointed a
custodian to serve as a tie-breaking director. See id. at *2.  Subsequently, the parties
agreed to either a sale of 100% of the stock of the corporation or a buyout by one
stockholder of the other, whichever was the best means of maximizing value for
the stockholders. See id. at *3.  The parties could not agree on working together
toward a consensual sale. See id. at *2.  Therefore, the court ordered the custodian
to act as an auctioneer and collect bids for the sale of the corporation as a going
concern, seeking to maximize shareholder value. See id. at *3.
85. 157 A.3d 152, 162 (Del. 2017) (recognizing appellant’s argument that sec-
tion 226 does not authorize custodian to sell solvent corporation over objection of
stockholders).
86. See id. at 155 (identifying issues before court on appeal).  On appeal,
Shawe raised statutory arguments. See id. (stating that Shawe argued for first time
on appeal that Court of Chancery exceeded statutory authority under section 226
by ordering custodian to sell solvent company and that Shirley Shawe argued for
first time on appeal that custodian’s sale of company might result in unconstitu-
tional taking of her one share of TPG stock).  The majority concluded the Shawes’
16
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firmed the Chancellor’s decision.87  In light of the facts and because inter-
mediate measures were attempted but failed, the Court of Chancery
properly exercised its discretion under section 226 to order the custodian
to sell the company and distribute proceeds to deadlocked stockholders.88
A. You Can’t Hide This Mess Under the Bed: The Facts and Procedure
in Shawe v. Elting
TransPerfect Global, Inc. (TPG) is a Delaware corporation that pro-
vides services worldwide.89  In 1992, TPG was co-founded by Elizabeth El-
ting (Elting) and Philip Shawe (Shawe).90  TPG is a closely-held
corporation that has one hundred shares of common stock issued and out-
standing.91  Shawe and Elting have behaved functionally as equal, non-
controlling, fifty percent co-owners of TPG, despite one share of TPG be-
ing owned by Shawe’s mother, Shirley Shawe.92  Shawe and Elting serve as
arguments were not properly before the court because they were raised for the first
time on appeal. See id.
87. See id. (affirming Court of Chancery’s decision and agreeing with Court of
Chancery’s conclusion that custodian should sell TPG).
88. See id. (finding lower court did not abuse discretion by ordering custodian
to sell corporation).  Conversely, the dissent argued that the Court of Chancery
did exceed its authority under section 226. See id. at 172 (Valihura, J., dissenting)
(concluding the Court of Chancery did not have power to order custodian to force
sale of stockholders’ shares under section 226).  The dissent felt that the statutory
argument should be heard although it was not raised below. See id.  In response,
the majority felt compelled to explain its interpretation of the custodian statute,
despite its conclusion that the Appellants could not raise the issue for the first time
on appeal. See id. at 155.
89. See id. (describing TPG as a Delaware corporation and identifying services
corporation provides to clients, including translation, website localization, and liti-
gation support services).
90. See id. at 155–56 (stating that Shawe and Elting co-founded TPG in 1992).
TPG acts as a holding company for its main operating company, TransPerfect In-
ternational, Inc. See id.  Together, the entities provide services from ninety-two
offices in eighty-six worldwide cities. See id. at 155.  The company has over 3,500
full-time employees and a network of over 10,000 translators, editors, and proof-
readers in 170 languages. See id.
91. See id. at 155–56 (describing equity structure of corporation and stating
how many shares corporation has issued and outstanding); see also In re Shawe &
Elting LLC, C.A. No. 9661-CB, C.A. No. 9686-CB, C.A. No. 9700-CB, C.A. No.
10449-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *18 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015) (describing TPG as
closely held private corporation).
92. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 155 (describing Elizabeth Elting’s and Philip
Shawe’s ownership of issued and outstanding shares of TPG stock).  Elting owns
fifty shares, and Shawe owns forty-nine shares. See id.  Shirley Shawe, the mother of
Shawe, owns one share. See id.  However, Shawe has treated his mother’s share as
his own property and himself as a fifty-percent co-owner of TPG. See id.  The Dela-
ware Supreme Court credited the Court of Chancery’s finding that Shawe has
treated his mother’s shares as his own and has treated himself as fifty-percent
owner of company. See id.  Shawe held a general proxy for his mother’s one share
of TPG in 2014, “giving him the ‘full and complete power to exercise at any
time . . . any and all rights to and/or arising from or connected with’” his mother’s
share. See In re Shawe & Elting, 2015 WL 4874733, at *2.  Elting also demonstrated
17
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co-chief executive officers and have been the only directors of TPG since
2007.93
Since Shawe and Elting founded TPG, their relationship deteriorated
due to their troubled romance.94  In 1996, the co-founders engaged to be
married, but Elting called off the marriage in 1997.95  When Elting ended
the engagement, Shawe responded by crawling under Elting’s bed and
refusing to leave.96  After the relationship ended, Shawe exhibited this
same behavior on another occasion.97
Over time, the personal issues between Shawe and Elting began to
affect TPG’s business affairs.98  For example, Shawe spied on Elting by
intercepting her mail, monitoring her phone calls, accessing her email,
and breaking into her locked office on various occasions.99  He recruited
TPG advisors to advance his agenda against Elting, fabricated documents,
and unilaterally hired employees to work in Elting’s divisions without her
that Shawe represented himself to third parties as “the 50% owner and Co-CEO of
the Company.” See id.  In addition, Shawe instructed the company’s accountants to
start efforts to get his mother’s one share back into his name. See id.  The Court of
Chancery thus found that Shawe and Elting behaved functionally as if they were
equal fifty-fifty owners of the corporation with equal, non-controlling ownership
interests. See id.
93. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 155–56 (stating that Shawe and Elting serve as co-
CEOs and board members of TPG and noting that Shawe and Elting have been
only directors of TPG since 2007).  In 2007, TPG underwent corporate reorganiza-
tion. See id. at 156. At that time, TPG’s bylaws were amended to provide for a
three-member board of directors, or a different number fixed by the corporation’s
stockholders. See id.  However, Shawe and Elting have been the only two directors
of TPG since the 2007 reorganization. See id.
94. See id. (stating that Court of Chancery’s decision was based upon foun-
ders’ troubled romantic relationship that began while they were attending business
school).
95. See id. (noting that Shawe and Elting were engaged from 1996 to 1997).
96. See id. at 156 n.3 (identifying one of two occasions when Shawe crawled
under Elting’s bed and refused to leave after she ended their engagement).  When
Elting married in 1999, Shawe did not take kindly to the news and would “terror-
ize” Elting and say “horrendous things” about Elting’s husband. See id. at 156.
97. See id. (identifying another occasion when Shawe crawled under Elting’s
bed and refused to leave).  Elting was traveling alone to Buenos Aries to find a new
office space. See id.  When she arrived at her hotel room, Shawe showed up unan-
nounced and proceeded to hide under her bed for about thirty minutes. See id.
98. See id. (stating founders allowed personal issues to influence company’s
business affairs).  The parties experienced “serious clashes” both before and dur-
ing the litigation. See id. at 156, 157 n.4.
99. See id. at 156 (identifying Shawe’s invasions of Elting’s privacy as causing
serious clashes between Shawe and Elting).  The emails that Shawe accessed in-
cluded thousands of privileged communications with her counsel. See id.  In addi-
tion to entering Elting’s locked office on his own, Shawe also sent his “paralegal”
there in the early hours of the morning on another occasion. See id. (the court
seemed skeptical of the characterization of Shawe’s colleague as a “paralegal”)
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consent.100  Finally, Shawe disparaged and marginalized Elting through
TPG memoranda and press releases.101
Their disputes directly involved and impacted the business of TPG.102
The parties frequently had “temper tantrums” over expenses.103  They
made efforts to hinder each other’s activities and decisions regarding pro-
posed acquisitions, stockholder distributions, hiring and pay, and office
locations.104  It was common for senior officers to be drawn into the co-
founders’ disputes and be subsequently abused for their involvement.105
Shawe bullied Elting and her supporters and created a hostile environ-
ment, attempting to pressure Elting to agree to his plans.106
The harassment, demoralization of TPG employees, and interference
with TPG’s business precipitated Elting’s petition under section 226 to de-
100. See id. (identifying Shawe’s misuse of TPG advisors and underhanded
hiring as causing serious clashes between TPG’s co-founders).
101. See id. at 156–57 (noting instances when Shawe disparaged and at-
tempted to marginalize Elting).  On one occasion, Shawe disseminated a memo-
randum on another TPG employee’s letterhead to employees in Elting’s division,
accusing Elting of collusion and financial improprieties. See id. at 156.  On an-
other occasion, Shawe publicly disparaged Elting by unilaterally issuing a press
release in TPG’s name that contained false and misleading statements. See id. at
156–57.
102. See id. at 157 (enumerating ways in which Shawe and Elting’s disputes
interfered with TPG business).
103. See id. (stating that Shawe and Elting had “continuous acrimonious dis-
putes over personal and business expenses” and “weekly if not daily temper
tantrums”).
104. See id. (identifying “mutual hostaging” over various TPG business deci-
sions as result of dispute between Shawe and Elting).  Shawe fired outside real
estate and public relations professionals, refused to execute leases, and interfered
with TPG’s payroll process. See id.  He refused to engage in the annual expense
true up, interfered with the annual review of TPG’s finances, and interfered with
the audit process. See id.  To avoid review by Elting, Shawe falsified corporate
records. See id.  Finally, Elting refused to pay counsel to defend patent ongoing
litigation for TPG. See id.
105. See id. (noting that TPG’s senior officers were drawn into Shawe and El-
ting’s disputes).  Because of their involvement, these officers were threatened with
firing, fines, withholding of compensation and promotions, and inappropriate
emails. See id.
106. See id. (expressing that Shawe created hostile environment for Elting and
those aligned with her).  Additionally, Shawe expressed a desire to “create constant
pain” for Elting until she conceded to his plans. See id.  Shawe went to great
lengths to harass Elting. See id.  For example, Elting once boarded a flight to Paris
to find Shawe seated across from her. See id.  It was later determined that Shawe
made the arrangements to be seated next to her without her knowledge after
learning of Elting’s flight plans. See id.  After Elting changed seats, Shawe sent a
message to two allies that read: “Was next to Liz on the plane to Paris and she
switched seats;).[sic]” See id.  Shawe claimed he had “no idea” Elting would be on
the flight, which was later found to be untrue. See id.  Due to Shawe’s message, the
court was not persuaded by Shawe’s characterization of the event as an attempt to
make peace with Elting. See id.  Instead, the court concluded it was another seized
opportunity for Shawe to harass Elting. See id.
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clare deadlock and appoint a custodian to sell TPG.107  After a lengthy
trial, the Chancellor appointed a custodian to assist the co-founders in
settling their disputes and gave the parties additional time to resolve their
differences, but these settlement attempts failed.108  In a subsequent opin-
ion, the Chancellor found both stockholder deadlock under section
226(a)(1) and director deadlock under section 226(a)(2).109
The Court of Chancery concluded that the distrust between the co-
founders “strikes at the heart of the palpable dysfunction that exists in the
governance of the Company” and that the deadlock caused actual and
threatened irreparable injury to TPG.110  The deadlock threatened TPG’s
morale, reputation, employee relations, client relations, and revenue-gen-
erating acquisitions.111  The Chancellor considered alternative remedies,
107. See id. at 157–58 (stating that harassment, employee demoralization, and
interference with business resulted in litigation and ultimately to Court of Chan-
cery’s appointment of custodian to sell corporation).  Initially, four lawsuits were
filed as a result of the incidents. See id. at 157.  On May 8, 2014, Elting filed a
motion to remove Shawe as a director of TransPerfect International, Inc. See id. at
157 n.7.  On May 15, 2014, Elting filed a verified petition for the dissolution of
Shawe and Elting LLC, the co-founder’s joint owned asset protection and distribu-
tion vehicle. See id.  On May 22, 2014 Shawe filed a verified complaint in the Court
of Chancery, both individually and derivatively on behalf of TPG, asserting various
claims against Elting, including waste, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment,
breach of contract, and indemnification. See id.  Finally, on May 23, 2014, Elting
filed her petition in the Court of Chancery, seeking the appointment of a custo-
dian to sell TPG and dissolution of TPG under the court’s equitable powers. See id.
108. See id. at 158 (noting Court of Chancery’s initial “measured step” to ap-
point custodian to mediate and attempt to remedy dispute between Shawe and
Elting after lengthy litigation).  Before taking any action, the Court of Chancery
held twelve hearings, decided sixteen motions, and conducted a six-day trial re-
garding the petition under section 226. See id.  The court delayed its post-trial
decision to appoint a custodian for the sale of TPG for two months in hopes the
parties could resolve the controversy. See id.  Only after that time did the Court of
Chancery issue its final, 104-page decision. See id.
109. See id. (finding that parties’ stipulation that they were divided as stock-
holders and unable to elect successor directors satisfied section 226(a)(1) and
finding that Elting’s petition satisfied all three requirements to demonstrate direc-
tor deadlock under section 226(a)(2)).
110. See id. (describing Court of Chancery’s findings in its lengthy 104-page
decision).  As to the existence of deadlock, the court found this element was satis-
fied by the many facts uncovered throughout the litigation regarding Shawe and
Elting’s distrust for one another. See id.  Regarding the inability to break director
deadlock, the court found this element was satisfied by the parties’ stipulation to
deadlock. See id.  After considering the profitability of TPG and noting that section
226 contemplates the appointment of a custodian for solvent corporations that can
suffer irreparable injury, the Court of Chancery found that the final require-
ment—harm to the business—was satisfied. See id.
111. See id. at 158–59 (cataloging many facts that demonstrated TPG was suf-
fering actual or threatened irreparable injury).  In particular, TPG’s Senior Vice
President of Sales called the feud between Shawe and Elting the “biggest business
issue” faced by TPG and was “the number 1 reason people leave to go to work at
competitors.” See id. at 158.  TPG’s Vice President of Corporate Development also
stated the feud was “so obviously the biggest problem the company faces.” See id.
TPG’s Chief Information Officer identified the need to find a way for Shawe and
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such as appointing a custodian to serve as a third director of TPG, but
determined these alternatives were insufficient.112  The Chancellor de-
cided the evidence warranted appointment of a custodian to sell the com-
pany and resolve the deadlocks.113  Shawe and his mother, Shirley Shawe,
appealed.114
Elting to work together “without negatively impacting everyone else” as a Company
goal. See id.  TPG’s Chief Technology Officer testified that the conflict “hurts com-
pany morale” and “is detrimental to the company.” See id.  TPG’s former Vice-
President of Human Resources stated the feud results in “pervasive and continu-
ous hostile environment where inappropriate behavior impacts the morale, health
and well-being of myself and the staff.” See id. at 159.
TPG’s Chief Operating Officer, referred to “mass exodus” of TPG workers,
attributable to “the ongoing disputes and stressful environment.” See id.  He fur-
ther stated that “[e]mployees are resigning and leaving these departments at un-
precedented rates,” that “[t]he morale and retention issue will likely spread,” and
that “[t]he company’s reputation is taking a beating, internally and externally.” See
id.  Finally, one TPG employee noted that the feud has “affected employee mo-
rale,” that workers feel “caught in the middle,” and that TPG therefore has an
“unhealthy work environment.” See id.
Even though Shawe acknowledged the “potential for grievously harming”
TPG, he continued his feud with Elting. See id.  Major TPG clients who were free
to use competitive servicers expressed concerned with the dispute. See id.  The
founders were unable to agree on major acquisitions, which generally accounted
for about sixteen to twenty percent of TPG’s annual revenue and between eight
and fourteen percent of its net profit. See id.  Despite TPG’s profitability, its gov-
ernance was inevitably dysfunctional. See id.
112. See id. at 159–60 (identifying Court of Chancery’s alternatives to ordering
custodian to sell TPG).  The Chancellor considered two alternatives to ordering
the custodian to sell the corporation under section 226. See id. at 159.  First, the
court considered it could “leave the parties to their own devices,” but quickly re-
jected this approach because the management of TPG was so dysfunctional that it
threatened irreparable harm to TPG. See id. (quoting In re Shawe & Elting LLC,
C.A. No. 9661-CB, C.A. No. 9686-CB, C.A. No. 9700-CB, C.A. No. 10449-CB, 2015
WL 4874733, at *31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015)).  Notably, the court stated, “equity
will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.” See id. (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
No. 5642, 1985 WL 11546, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 1985), aff’d, 497 A.2d 792 (Del.
1985)).
Second, the court considered appointing the custodian to serve as a third director
or act in a capacity to break ties between the warring factions. See id.  The court
rejected this argument, stating “it would enmesh an outsider and, by extension,
the Court into matters of internal corporate governance for an extensive period of
time . . . It is not sensible for the Court to exercise essentially perpetual oversight
over the internal affairs of the Company.” See id. at 160 (quoting In re Shawe &
Elting, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31).
113. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 159–60 (outlining Court of Chancery’s reasoning
in ordering custodian to sell TPG).  The final option was appointing the custodian
to sell the company in order to separate Shawe and Elting in order to protect TPG
from the pair’s dysfunctional relationship. See id. at 160.  The Chancellor recog-
nized that this was an unusual remedy to be implemented with extreme caution,
but found that case law interpreting section 226 and the facts of the case permitted
the action. See id.
114. See id. at 154 (“Philip Shawe and his mother, Shirley Shawe, have filed an
interlocutory appeal from the Court of Chancery’s August 13, 2015 opinion and
July 18, 2016 order, and related orders, appointing a custodian under 8 Del. C.
§ 226 to sell TransPerfect Global, Inc., a Delaware corporation.”).
21
DeBona: If You Climb Into Bed With Your Business Partner, the Court Might
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
522 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 501
B. The Court Finds That the Corporate Bed Is Big Enough for Three –
Shawe, Elting, and the Custodian
On appeal, the court concluded that there was indisputable director
and stockholder deadlock under both section 226(a)(1) and section
226(a)(2) and refused to disturb the Chancellor’s detailed factual findings
of threatened and irreparable harm to the company on appeal.115  Argu-
ing that judicial intervention should be limited to extreme circumstances,
Shawe contented that the Chancellor erred and should have applied a
more rigorous “imminent corporate paralysis” standard to find deadlock
under section 226(a)(2).116  Nevertheless, the court concluded that the
Chancellor did not misapply the threatened or actual irreparable injury
requirement.117
The court found that the Chancellor properly applied the statute and
principles of irreparable injury to evaluate the likelihood of threatened or
irreparable injury to TPG.118  It emphasized that “irreparable injury” is an
equitable principle that takes into account multiple factors, such as “harm
to a corporation’s reputation, goodwill, customer relationships, and em-
115. See id. at 161–62 (identifying and analyzing Shawe’s statutory argument
regarding application of facts to provision of section 226; finding that deadlock
was undisputable under two provisions of section 226; and finding that trial record
amply supported Court of Chancery’s finding that deadlock between TPG’s foun-
ders caused threatened and actual irreparable injury to the company).  First,
Shawe challenged the Chancery’s appointment of a custodian under section
226(a)(2), claiming that the Chancellor misapplied the requirement of finding
irreparable injury to the business of the corporation due to director deadlock
under section 226(a)(2). See id. at 161.  Shawe claimed that the Chancery improp-
erly relied on case law that defined “irreparable injury” in the temporary injunc-
tion context. See id.  Shawe did not challenge the Court of Chancery’s
appointment of a custodian under section 226(a)(1) due to stockholder deadlock
on appeal. See id.  Shawe stipulated to the stockholder deadlock required by that
provision of the statute. See id.  In fact, the majority recognized that Shawe’s irrep-
arable injury argument under section 226(a)(1) was “academic” because Shawe
agreed that the Chancery was authorized to appoint a custodian under section
226(a)(1), which requires no showing of irreparable injury. See id.
116. See id. at 161 (stating Shawe believed Court of Chancery should have
applied more stringent standard for finding irreparable injury under section 226).
117. See id. (finding that Chancellor did not apply irreparable injury require-
ment under section 226(a)(2)).
118. See id. at 161–62 (“The Court of Chancery properly applied the words of
the statute and settled principles of irreparable injury to evaluate the likelihood of
threatened or actual irreparable injury to the Company’s business.”).  To describe
the standard as the Court of Chancery did or to define it as “imminent corporate
paralysis” would be “distinction without difference” because the court in Giuricich
used the terms interchangeably. See id. (citing Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d
232, 238 (Del. 1982)) (noting Shawe’s “imminent corporate paralysis” standard
and Court of Chancery’s standard applied below are, for all intents and purposes,
identical under section 226(a)(2)).  In Giuricich, the court described “imminent
corporate paralysis” as equivalent to “irreparable harm” when considering whether
irreparable harm is required before appointment of custodian under § 226(a)(1).
See id. at 161, 161 n.29 (citing Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 238).
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ployee morale.”119  Further, the record supported the Chancellor’s find-
ing of actual and threatened irreparable injury.120  While TPG was
profitable, the acrimonious relationship between its founders had a chil-
ling effect on all of the company’s operations, and if this were to persist,
TPG would continue on a path toward employee discontent and business
ruin.121
Next, Shawe argued that the Court of Chancery exceeded its statutory
authority by ordering the custodian to sell a solvent company over the
objection of stockholders and that, even if the statutory authority existed,
the Chancellor should have tried other measures to address the deadlock
before resorting to a sale of the Company.122  In response, the court deter-
119. See id. at 162–62 (quoting In re Shawe & Elting LLC, C.A. No. 9661-CB,
C.A. No. 9686-CB, C.A. No. 9700-CB, C.A. No. 10449-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28
(Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015)) (emphasizing that “irreparable injury” is equitable prin-
ciple that considers multiple factors).
120. See id. at 162 (finding that trial record amply supported Court of Chan-
cery’s finding that deadlock between TPG’s founders caused threatened and actual
irreparable injury to the company).
121. See id. (“If allowed to persist, the Company was likely to continue on the
path of plummeting employee morale, key employee departures, customer uncer-
tainty, damage to the Company’s public reputation and goodwill, and a fundamen-
tal inability to grow the Company through acquisitions.”).
122. See id. at 160 (identifying Shawe’s primary arguments raised on appeal).
Bound by Delaware Supreme Court Rules, the majority found Shawe could not
raise these statutory interpretation arguments for the first time on appeal because
he failed to raise them before the Court of Chancery. See id.  Per Supreme Court
Rule 8, the Delaware Supreme Court requires that arguments be considered for
the first time by the trial court before they may be heard on appeal. See id. at 162,
168; see also DEL. SUP. CT. R. 8.  Shawe contended that he raised the statutory issues
below, but the court concluded that Shawe’s citations to the record in support of
this contention actually supported the opposite conclusion. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at
162 n.32.  For example, Shawe made statements that the statue “discourages disso-
lution,” that Elting did not meet “the very high standard for appointment of a
custodian to dissolve and sell” TPG, and that “dissolution is a last, not first resort.”
See id. (quoting trial court record).  Therefore, the argument was waived. See id. at
163.  Nevertheless, in response to the dissent’s lengthy analysis of Shawe’s argu-
ments and of section 226, the majority considered the merits of Shawe’s argu-
ments. See id. at 163 n.33.  The dissent, however, criticized the majority for
responding to the waived statutory interpretation arguments. See id. at 163 n.33.
Yet, the majority felt “obliged” to respond to the dissent’s “exhaustive analysis” of
section 226 that it believed was “mistaken.” See id. In addition, Shirley Shawe ar-
gued for the first time that the ordering the custodian to sell TPG would violate
her rights under both the state and federal constitutions. See id. at 168–69.  The
court, however, quickly dismissed Shirley Shawe’s argument. See id.  In contrast to
her son’s arguments, the majority did not feel obliged to address the merits of
Shirley Shawe’s constitutional argument although it was also raised for the first
time, and thus waived, on appeal. See id. at 168.  Unlike her son, Shirley Shawe did
not posit that she raised the issue below and, instead, admitted that she did not
properly present the constitutional issue to the Court of Chancery. See id.  Shirley
Shawe argued that the Supreme Court should hear her constitutional issue under
the “interests of justice exception” to Delaware Supreme Court Rule 8. See id. at
169.  This exception applies only if the Supreme Court “finds that the trial court
committed plain error requiring review in the interests of justice.” See id. at 168.
The court found that Shirley Shawe failed to meet this standard. See id. at 169.
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mined that the Chancellor ordered the custodian to sell the company only
after less intrusive measures were attempted and proven  ineffective.123
The court also concluded that the decision to appoint a custodian to sell
TPG was supported by the facts, was permitted by the statute, and there-
fore was not an abuse of discretion.124
Examining the express language of section 226(b), the court con-
cluded that the Court of Chancery did not exceed its statutory authority by
ordering the custodian to sell TPG.125  As the court stated, “Under a plain
reading of section 226(b), the custodian has the powers of a receiver
under [section] 291, and his duties are to continue the business unless the
[c]ourt otherwise orders, and except under the special circumstances of
abandoned businesses and close corporations.”126  Thus, the default duty
of the custodian is to “continue the business of the corporation.”127  How-
ever, the provision expressly grants the Court of Chancery authority to
displace this default duty and “otherwise order” the custodian to “liquidate
the [corporation’s] affairs and distribute its assets” rather than “continue
the business of the corporation.”128
The court emphasized its prior recognition of the Court of Chan-
cery’s broad authority under the statute, specifically with regard to the
incorporation of a receiver’s powers under section 291.129  Under section
291, the receiver shall have the powers that “the Court shall deem neces-
sary.”130  Following Giuricich, the court determined the Court of Chancery
has the same broad discretion to determine the specific powers of the cus-
todian under Section 226 as it does under Section 291.131  Therefore, the
123. See id. at 160 (finding that Court of Chancery took “measured approach”
by ordering custodian to sell TPG only after attempting less intrusive measures).
124. See id. (concluding that court’s decision to appoint custodian to sell TPG
was supported by facts found after trial, was permitted by statute, and was not an
abuse of discretion).
125. See id. at 163–65 (examining plain language of section 226 and conclud-
ing Court of Chancery has broad authority to order custodian to sell corporation
under statute).
126. See id. at 164 (parsing through express language of section 226 to deter-
mine custodian’s duties and court’s ability to determine those duties).
127. See id. at 163 (quoting § 226 and acknowledging that section 226 man-
dates that custodian’s default duty is to continue business of corporation).
128. See id. (quoting § 226 and expressly granting Court of Chancery author-
ity to “otherwise order” and displace custodian’s default duty under section 226).
129. See id. at 163–64 (“This Court has also recognized the broad authority
granted the Court of Chancery under the statute.”).
130. See id. at 164 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 291 (West 2018)) (stating
court has discretion to determine powers of receiver under section 291).
131. See id. (stating Court of Chancery’s broad authority to set receiver’s pow-
ers under section 291 leads to same conclusion for custodian’s authority under
section 226).  Although the court previously held that the authority of a custodian
should be exercised only to the extent that fairness and justice require, it also
recognized that section 226(b) sets the maximum statutory limits of the power of
the custodian. See id.  These powers may include the power of a receiver to under
section 291. See id.
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Court of Chancery’s broad equitable power under the statute includes the
authority to order the custodian’s sale of a corporation.132  The court’s
conclusion was supported by the Court of Chancery’s decisions in Bentas,
Fulk, In re Supreme Oil Company, and Brown.133
Additionally, the court addressed the dissent’s discontent with the
recognition that the case “was within a whisker” of cases under section 273
of the DGCL, which permits dissolution of joint venture corporations
when equal fifty percent owner-stockholders are deadlocked.134  The
court, however, found that it was not error on the part of the Chancellor
to look to cases decided under section 273 for guidance.135  The only
The dissent did not disagree that the statute expressly grants a custodian
under section 226 all of the powers of a receiver under section 291. See id.  How-
ever, the dissent appeared to argue that the custodian cannot exercise the powers
of a receiver when the court “otherwise orders” that the deadlocked corporation
be sold. See id. at 162, 164, 172–73 n.12, 181 n.63.  The majority framed the dis-
sent’s argument as follows:
According to the dissent, even though the language “except as the Court shall
otherwise order” directly modifies the phrase coming before it—”not to liquidate
its affairs and distribute its assets”“—and is followed by the words “and except”“—
the dissent argues that interpretive principles should be applied to require that the
exception language be read to permit liquidation only in circumstances similar to
§ 226(a)(3) (corporations that have abandoned their business) and § 352(a)(3)
(custodians for close corporations).
Id. at 164.  The majority felt that the dissent’s reliance on principles of statutory
interpretation was misguided. See id.  Where a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the plain meaning controls. See id. (citing LeVan v. Independence Mall, Inc., 940
A.2d 929, 932–33 (Del. 2007)).  In addition, the majority argued that the dissent’s
interpretation of section 226 ignored the conjunctive words “and” and “except”
used in the statute. See id.  The inclusion of these words indicates that the statute
lists three distinct exceptions to the custodian’s default duty: “ ‘except when the
court shall otherwise order,’ and ‘except in cases arising under paragraph (a)(3)
of [section 226] or [section] 352(a)(2) of [the DGCL].’” See id. (quoting § 226).
132. See id. at 163 (stating Court of Chancery has broad authority under sec-
tion 226 and that authority includes ordering sale).
133. See id. (citing In re Supreme Oil Co., Inc., No. 10618-VCL, 2015 WL
2455952, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015); Bentas v. Haseotes, No. Civ. A. 17223-NC,
2003 WL 1711856, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003); Fulk v. Wash. Serv. Assocs., Inc.,
No. Civ. A. 17747-NC, 2002 WL 1402273, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002); Bentas v.
Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 73 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2000); Brown v. Rosenberg, No. 833, 1981
WL 7638, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1981)).  The court noted that the cited cases
involved actions in which the parties eventually agreed that the business should be
sold. See id. at 163 n.36.  However, the court emphasized that the cases demon-
strate the Court of Chancery’s exercise of its broad discretion to determine the
best remedy to resolve corporate deadlock. See id.
134. See id. at 165 (citation omitted) (discussing dissent’s discontent with
Court of Chancery’s reliance on section 273 and on remedies for deadlock arising
under section 273).  The majority recognized that section 273 has frequently been
used to end corporate deadlock through the sale of corporations ordered by the
Court of Chancery. See id.  Thus, the dissent was misguided to contend that the
Court of Chancery’s order to sell a solvent Delaware corporation as a going con-
cern in the best interest of its constituencies was unprecedented. See id.
135. See id. (“That the Chancellor looked for guidance to the remedies en-
tered in cases under § 273 was not error on his part.”).
25
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“novelty” was that Shawe arose under section 226 because it did not fit
precisely within the fifty-fifty ambit of section 273.136  Using section 273
for guidance demonstrated the Chancellor’s understanding that TPG’s ec-
onomic reality is essentially identical to a fifty-fifty deadlock and that the
tools provided by the DGCL to address that deadlock would inform his
discretion under section 226.137
Likewise, the court concluded Shawe’s argument—that the Chancel-
lor could not order the sale of the solvent corporation over stockholders’
objection—was null, especially considering that sale of TPG as a going
concern would best benefit its employees and stockholders.138  Stockhold-
ers of Delaware corporations are aware that their rights to their shares are
subject to the Court of Chancery’s power under statutes like section
226.139  The court emphasized that sales of corporate assets or of the en-
tire corporation are not unusual when the corporation is profitable.140
The court was unconvinced by any attempt to distinguish between the sale
of the corporation as a going concern rather than as mere liquidation of
136. See id. (stating only “novelty” to distinguish present case from cases
under section 273 was that present case arose under section 226).  The only fact
barring the present case from consideration under section 273 was that Shawe and
Elting were not fifty-fifty shareholders in fact. See id. at 155, 165.  Even though
Shawe and Elting behaved as equal owners, Shirley Shawe’s ownership of one
share of TPG precluded use of section 273. See id.
137. See id. at 165 (acknowledging Court of Chancery’s thorough understand-
ing of case and efficient use of DGCL for guidance).  The majority emphasized
that the flexible and efficient design of the DGCL allows the Court of Chancery to
analyze cases on a situational basis and use its discretion to “deal sensibly with
corporations,” even if that includes looking for guidance in other sections of the
DGCL. See id.
138. See id. at 166 n.46 (indicating that absence of cases where stockholders
object to sale of corporation is not surprising and therefore is not dispositive); id.
at 166 (“Selling TPG as a going concern will protect TPG’s employees from the
ruinous consequences of an asset sale and provide the maximum return to the
stockholders.”).
139. See id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 (West 2018)) (reasoning that
stockholders of Delaware corporations are on notice of Court of Chancery’s broad
authority that may affect fundamental ownership interests).  Stockholders of Dela-
ware corporations are only entitled to the rights that are inherent with their stock.
See id.  Those rights are subject to the Court of Chancery’s power under provisions
of the DGCL. See id.  Stockholders are made aware of this because the provisions
of the DCGL are adopted into any Delaware corporation’s corporate charter by
way of section 394. See id. at 163, 165.  It would be inconsistent with the practical
design of the DGCL to allow stockholders to cling to their shares only to receive a
final, lower, liquidating dividend. See id. at 166.
140. See id. (explaining that most cases in which court has ordered sale dealt
with profitable corporations).  The court further reasoned that this was unsurpris-
ing. See id.  Especially in the Court of Chancery, parties are more inclined to fight
over solvent corporations because insolvent corporations’ cases are dealt with by
the federal bankruptcy courts. See id.  Parties that are severely deadlocked often
rarely want asset sales or dissolution, which the dissent characterized as lesser rem-
edies. See id.
26
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its assets.141  Importantly, the court recognized that liquidation of TPG’s
assets or sale of TPG as a going concern would achieve the same ultimate
end in this case.142  To distinguish between the two would elevate form
over substance.143
Finally, the court addressed Shawe’s contention that the Chancellor
should have experimented with less intrusive measures before ordering
the sale of TPG.144  The court agreed with Shawe that sale is a remedy to
be used “cautiously” and “reluctantly.”145  The Court of Chancery should
always consider less drastic means before ordering the custodian to sell a
solvent corporation.146  However, the court emphasized that the best rem-
edy to address deadlock is within the Chancellor’s discretion, and the
Court of Chancery did not abuse its discretion in this case.147
Ultimately, the court determined that the Court of Chancery is in the
best position to assess the viability of remedies when a corporation faces
deadlock.148  First, the Chancellor attempted a less intrusive measure by
appointing a custodian at the end of trial to serve as a mediator to resolve
the disputes and by giving the parties at least four months to reach a reso-
141. See id. at 165 (declaring that there is no merit in characterizing method
chosen by Chancellor as different from section 273 for purposes of section 226
because it involved sale of corporation’s stock rather than its underlying assets).
142. See id. (stating that making distinction between liquidation and sale has
no practical effect in present case).  TPG acts as a holding company for TPI, the
main, wholly-owned operating company. See id.  If the court were to order an asset
sale on remand, the Court of Chancery could sell TPG’s assets, including TPI and
its other subsidiaries, and then distribute the proceeds to TPG and its stockhold-
ers. See id.  Shawe conceded that this was the case. See id.  Neither Shawe nor
Elting wanted an asset sale. See id.  The court expressed that “[s]uch meaningless
corporate shuffling illustrates why” selling TPG instead of its parts is within the
custodian’s powers under section 226. See id.  In addition, the majority asserted
that the dissent made no substantive response to this “reality.” See id. at 166 n.48.
The dissent merely claimed that the point was not conceded by the Shawes and
that during the appeal no party suggested liquidation or asset sale as options. See
id. at 166 n.48, 172–73 n.12.
143. See id. at 166 (explaining that directing Court of Chancery to order asset
sale “could exalt form over substance” by allowing sale of TPG’s wholly owned
operating company TPI).
144. See id. at 166–67 (detailing ways in which Court of Chancery attempted
less intrusive remedies before ordering custodian to sell TPG).
145. See id. at 166 (advocating for Shawe’s position that sale of corporation is
a remedy to be used reluctantly and only after consideration of other remedies).
146. See id. (“The Court of Chancery should always consider less drastic alter-
natives before authorizing the custodian to sell a solvent company.”).
147. See id. (stating that choice of remedy to address corporation’s deadlock is
ultimately within Court of Chancery’s discretion and that court of Chancery did
not abuse its discretion in this case).  The court reviewed the Chancellor’s choice
to order the custodian to sell TPG under the abuse of discretion standard. See id.
at 166 n.49.
148. See id. at 167 (recognizing Chancellor was in best position to assess reme-
dies to cure deadlock, including those less extreme than sale).
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lution before ordering the custodian’s sale of TPG.149  In addition, the
Chancellor considered whether to appoint a custodian to serve as a third
director or some form of tie-breaking figure, but exercised its judgement
to conclude doing so would be ineffective.150
The court refused to “second-guess” on appeal the Chancellor’s deter-
mination that the dysfunction between Shawe and Elting “must be excised
to safeguard the [c]ompany.”151  Thus, the court affirmed the Court of
Chancery’s order for the custodian appointed under section 226 to sell
TPG.152  In a separate decision, the court awarded $7,103,755 to Elting,
which included the fees she incurred litigating the merits of the case.153
149. See id. (explaining that Chancellor immediately appointed custodian to
serve as mediator to assist in resolving issues and explaining that mediation at-
tempts failed and Chancellor provided parties with another month to settle dis-
putes before issuing post-trial opinion to order sale of TPG).  Therefore, the court
declared that “[t]he Court of Chancery gave the parties every opportunity to re-
solve their acrimonious dispute outside the courthouse.” Id.
150. See id. (discussing Chancellor’s consideration of appointing custodian to
serve as third director or in some tie-breaking capacity and Chancellor’s determi-
nation that such remedy would be ineffective).  The court quoted—for the second
time in the opinion—the Chancellor’s language rejecting this option:
[I]t would enmesh an outsider, and, by extension, the Court into matters of inter-
nal corporate governance for an extensive period of time. Shawe and Elting are
both relatively young.  Absent a separation their tenure as directors and co-CEOs
of the Company could continue for decades.  It is not sensible for the Court to
exercise essentially perpetual oversight over the internal affairs of the Company.
Id. at 160 (quoting In re Shawe & Elting LLC, C.A. No. 9661-CB, C.A. No. 9686-CB,
C.A. No. 9700-CB, C.A. No. 10449-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13,
2015)).  Shawe characterized the Chancellor’s remedy as extremely intrusive. See
id. at 167.  However, the court concluded that, in light of “the abundant record
that Shawe and Elting cannot work together constructively [,]” the custodian ap-
pointed to serve as a tie-breaker would need to be a “constant monitor.” See id.
This approach would be “expensive, cumbersome, and very intrusive.” See id.  Most
importantly, however, the court declared that the Chancellor properly rejected
this remedy because it would not allow TPG to “capitalize on its business model.”
See id.  In contrast, the Chancellor’s order to sell TPG preserved the company as a
whole and therefore allowed it be owned and managed in accord with the de-
mands of commerce. See id.  Additionally, the order to sell TPG as a going concern
protected TPG’s constituencies. See id.
151. See id. (quoting In re Shawe & Elting LLC, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31)
(acknowledging that Chancellor exercised “extreme caution” that must be used
before ordering sale and that Chancellor determined it was “painfully obvious”
that Shawe and Elting needed to be separated in management of TPG).
152. See id. at 169 (“The Court of Chancery’s August 13, 2015 opinion and
July 18, 2016 order, and the related orders, are affirmed.”).
153. See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 142, 152 (Del. 2017) (affirming award to
Elting for costs and fees), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 93 (2017).  The court affirmed
Elting’s award of $7,103,755 in fees and expenses. See id.  This included 33% of
the fees she incurred litigating the merits of the case, as well as the fees and ex-
penses incurred in her bringing a motion for sanctions against Shawe for his be-
havior throughout the litigation. See id. at 144.
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IV. SLEEPING WITH THE RIGHT IDEAS: AN ANALYSIS OF SHAWE AND ITS
WARNINGS FOR CORPORATIONS AND COUNSEL
In light of cases interpreting section 226, the structure of and princi-
ples underlying the DGCL, and the equitable powers of the Court of
Chancery, Shawe was properly decided.154  The decision reaffirms the
broad scope of the Court of Chancery’s equitable powers and ultimately
serves as a warning sign to Delaware corporations facing deadlock.155  Af-
ter Shawe, Delaware corporations and their counsel should implement pol-
icies to prevent deadlock from occurring, plan to resolve deadlock
privately, and evaluate the risks of statutory remedies.156
A. Critical Analysis: The Corporate Relationship Might Not Be Consistent,
but the Shawe Decision Is
Shawe is consistent with the cases interpreting section 226.157  As indi-
cated by the court, it is not unprecedented for the Court of Chancery to
determine that a solvent corporation must be sold as a going concern
when doing so is in the best interest of its constituencies.158  The court
issued similar orders in Bentas, Fulk, and In re Supreme Oil.159  This is allow-
154. For a discussion of why Shawe was properly decided, see infra notes
156–80 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of why Shawe reaffirms the Court of Chancery’s powers
and why Shawe is a warning for Delaware corporations, see infra notes 181–86 and
accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of how Delaware corporations and counsel should han-
dle deadlock after Shawe, see infra notes 187–206 and accompanying text.
157. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 163 n.36 (citing In re Supreme Oil Co., Inc., No.
10618-VCL, 2015 WL 2455952, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015); Bentas v. Haseotes,
No. Civ. A. 17223 NC, 2003 WL 1711856, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003); Fulk v.
Wash. Serv. Assocs., Inc., No. Civ. A. 17747-NC, 2002 WL 1402273, at *2 (Del. Ch.
June 21, 2002); Bentas v. Haseotes, 769 A.2d 70, 73 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2000); Brown v.
Rosenberg, No. 833, 1981 WL 7638, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1981) (recognizing
that court’s decision is consistent with Court of Chancery’s previous authorizations
for custodian to sell deadlocked corporations in these cases)); see also Bentas, 2003
WL 1711856, at *4 (granting custodian’s motion to order auction and sell corpora-
tion and its stock as going concern, rather than conducting asset sale); Fulk, 2002
WL 1402273, at *13–14 (approving custodian’s proposed plan to sell corporation
as going concern with its primary business intact); In re Supreme Oil, Inc., 2015 WL
2455952, at *1, *6 (ordering custodian to sell profitable company).
158. See Shawe, 157 A.3d. at 165 (“[I]t is by no means unprecedented for the
Court of Chancery to have to address the fate of a solvent Delaware corporation by
setting up a fair process to have it sold as a going concern, when that outcome is
necessary to best protect its constituencies.”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273
(West 2018) (permitting dissolution of corporations).
159. See Bentas, 2003 WL 1711856, at *4 (granting custodian’s motion to order
auction and sell corporation and its stock as going concern rather than conducting
asset sale); Fulk, 2002 WL 1402273, at *13–14 (approving custodian’s proposed
plan to sell corporation as going concern with its primary business intact); In re
Supreme Oil, Inc., 2015 WL 2455952, at *1, *6 (ordering custodian to sell profitable
company).
29
DeBona: If You Climb Into Bed With Your Business Partner, the Court Might
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
530 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 501
able because the DGCL explicitly subjects Delaware stockholders to the
equitable powers of the Court of Chancery.160
As section 394 of the DGCL expresses, all Delaware corporations
agree to incorporate the provisions of the DGCL into their charters.161  It
is therefore reasonable to conclude that Delaware stockholders’ shares are
subject to the enabling statutes in the DGCL.162  As Shawe noted, there are
many Delaware statutes that affect stockholders’ rights, some of which
even require stockholders to give up shares.163  The practical effect and
design of the DGCL demand that Delaware corporations and their stock-
holders succumb to the equitable remedies fashioned by the Court of
Chancery when justice requires.164
Like all provisions of the DGCL, Section 226 permits the Court of
Chancery to deal with cases on a situational basis in order to fashion the
best remedy.165  Therefore, the court properly focused on the language
“except as when the Court shall otherwise order” in section 226.166  This
160. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 165 (citing § 394) (“Stockholders of Delaware cor-
porations are only entitled to the rights that come with their stock, and those
rights are subject to the Court of Chancery’s power under statutes like [section]
226.”) (citation omitted); see also Heyman & Lint, supra note 32, at 479–80 (recog-
nizing that DGCL statutes explicitly grant Court of Chancery jurisdiction over mat-
ters arising thereunder); Ladig & Gay, supra note 40, at 1076 (recognizing statutes
that “empower” Court of Chancery).
161. See § 394 (“This chapter and all amendments thereof shall be a part of
the charter or certificate of incorporation of every corporation except so far as the
same are inapplicable and inappropriate to the objects of the corporation.”).
162. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 163 (citing § 394) (recognizing that all corpora-
tions agree to incorporate provisions of DGCL into their charters).  When stock-
holder’s purchase stock in Delaware corporations, they know that the DGCL
provides the Court of Chancery with broad authority to address corporate issues
and that authority may affect their ownership interests. See id. at 165.
163. See id. (stating that many Delaware statutes subject stockholders to sale of
their shares, even over stockholders’ objections); Fulk, 2002 WL 1402273, at *8
(acknowledging shareholder’s objection to custodian’s plan for sale but approving
custodian’s plan over objections).
164. See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 32, at 855 (recognizing that law must
be flexible in order for equity to meet society’s needs and that Court of Chancery
is not bound by restrictive legal doctrines and can adapt to factual situations when
no adequate remedy is available at law); Johnson, supra note 32, at 724 (recogniz-
ing that legislatively-enacted corporate statutes are countered by judicially-imposed
duties that constrain managerial misbehavior that goes too far).
165. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 165 (“But, consistent with the flexible and efficient
design of the DGCL, § 226 allows the Court of Chancery to address this situation
by using its power to deal with cases on a situational basis.”); see also Quillen &
Hanrahan, supra note 32, at 821–22 (observing equity requires courts to respond
to specific situations, rather than relying on universal rules, noting that particular
facts control, and stating that Delaware adheres to these maxims); Johnson, supra
note 32, at 713 (noting courts of equity must act when “doing so is necessary for
the greater attainment of justice”).
166. See LeVan v. Independence Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 932–33 (Del. 2007)
(mandating that when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, plain mean-
ing controls and precludes need for judicial interpretation); Shawe, 157 A.3d at
164–65 (adopting and applying “plain meaning” analysis and stating this is “key
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language clearly intends to give the court “the discretion to deal sensibly
with corporations that are unable to move forward.”167  Consistent with
the comprehensive and flexible design of the DGCL, the court had the
discretion to look to other provisions of the DGCL, such as section 273, to
ensure that TPG’s stockholders and employees would “not suffer a wrong
without a remedy.”168
However, the Shawe court appropriately recognized the risks of judi-
cial interference in corporate governance, and emphasized that it should
be reluctant to intervene in corporate affairs unless justice demands ac-
tion.169  This aligns with the attitude Delaware courts generally have to-
ward such action.170 Shawe presented a set of unique circumstances that
required the court to act.171  Although extreme, the benefits of the game-
ending decision to sell the corporation outweighed the benefits of inter-
fering with the board of directors for an uncertain period of time.172  The
language” under section 226 and that it is significant and to be read in accord with
overall design of the statute).
167. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 165 (“[W]e read it consistently with the overall
design of the statute, and its intention to allow our Court of Chancery the discre-
tion to deal sensibly with corporations that are unable to move forward with gov-
ernance[.]”).  When section 226 was amended in 1967, the “custodian” language
was added to enhance the power of the court to remedy deadlock. See Giuricich v.
Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 237 n.10 (Del. 1982); see also COX & HAZEN, supra note
52, § 14:15 (recognizing that section 226 was liberalized by amendment).  There-
fore, it is reasonable to suggest the Court of Chancery has flexibility to fashion
remedies under section 226. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 165.
168. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1985) (“Quite simply,
equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.”); see also Shawe, 157 A.3d at 165
(noting Chancellor properly looked for guidance under section 273 to fashion
remedy under section 226); Fulk, 2002 WL 1402273, at *10-11 (interpreting sec-
tions 226 and 273 together); Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 32, at 855 (implying
that Court of Chancery must be able to respond to cases using flexibility of
DGCL).
169. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 166 (noting intrusive and extreme remedies
should be employed “reluctantly” and only after consideration of less drastic reme-
dies).  The Court of Chancery expressed its hesitation to “enmesh an outsider and,
by extension, the Court into matters of internal corporate governance for an ex-
tensive period of time.” See id. at 160 (quoting In re Shawe & Elting LLC, C.A. No.
96661-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015)).
170. See Horsey, supra note 42, at 984–85 (providing that courts of equity can-
not control managing bodies unless necessary to do so); Heyman & Lint, supra
note 32, at 484 (commenting that Delaware courts should be hesitant to use equi-
table principles to override established principles of corporate law, such as busi-
ness judgement rule); Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 32, at 864 (recognizing
Delaware’s “desire to let business decisions be made by the directors and stock-
holders of Delaware corporations rather than by the Court”).
171. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 155–57, 167 (cataloging extreme facts of TPG’s
deadlock, acknowledging that facts in Shawe caused irreparable injury to TPG, and
refusing to disturb factual findings on appeal).
172. See id. at 167 (finding that sale of TPG was preferable over other reme-
dies).  Although Shawe felt that the sale was extremely intrusive, appointing a cus-
todian to constantly monitor the parties would be required according to the
record indicating Shawe and Elting had no chance of working together construc-
tively. See id.  This would be “expensive, cumbersome, and very intrusive.” See id.
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remedy was appropriate because it provided the greatest benefits to TPG’s
stockholders and employees; this was consistent with Delaware’s initiative
to protect the corporation’s constituencies.173  Likewise, allowing the sale
of TPG as a going concern enabled the custodian to keep TPG’s business
intact, consistent with the duty to “continue the business of the corpora-
tion” under section 226.174
Additionally, Shawe is unsurprising because of its unique facts that
made the deadlock so extreme.175  These were the circumstances in which
an extreme remedy should be implemented—it was the “last resort” neces-
sary to protect the interests of TPG and its constituencies.176  Importantly,
Shawe makes it clear that the court should “reluctantly and cautiously” or-
der sale, which is an “unusual” remedy; less extreme and intrusive options
must be considered.177  After Shawe, it is likely that less extreme remedies
will be employed in most cases arising under section 226.178
Most importantly, it would not allow the company to capitalize on its business
model. See id.
173. See id. (asserting that sale of TPG was most beneficial for company’s con-
stituencies).  Preserving the company as a whole protected TPG’s business and em-
ployees. See id.  Doing so would allow the company to be owned and managed in a
way that would allow it to function effectively. See id.  Positioning the company to
succeed would help it to become profitable and secure jobs for employees. See id.
Likewise, sale would provide maximum return to TPG’s stockholders. See id. at
166.  These concerns are consistent with Delaware’s concern for corporate constit-
uencies. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 44, at 440-41 (recognizing that
Delaware courts seek to protect corporate constituencies, most importantly stock-
holders); Stout, supra note 44, at 170 (recognizing that courts protect corporate
constituencies, such as stockholders and employees).
174. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226 (West 2018) (stating custodian must
“continue the business of the corporation”); Shawe, 157 A.3d at 167 (explaining
how sale of TPG allows its business to continue by preserving company as whole).
175. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 155–57, 167 (cataloging extreme facts of TPG’s
deadlock, acknowledging that facts in Shawe caused irreparable injury to TPG, and
refusing to disturb factual findings on appeal).  In Shawe, the dissension between
Shawe and Elting was very well-documented. See id. at 155–57.  The “personal na-
ture of the long-running discord” caused irreparable injury to TPG. See id. at 156,
162.
176. See id. at 162 (explaining that extremely dysfunctional relationship be-
tween Shawe and Elting affected all of TPG’s operations).  The dysfunction and
dissension between Shawe and Elting was so extreme that it absolutely needed to
be eradicated in order to protect TPG. See id. at 167.  They needed to be separated
from the management, and sale was the best way of doing so. See id.  The Court of
Chancery was in the best position to make this determination. See id.
177. See id. at 160, 166–67 (recognizing that sale is an “unusual” and “ex-
treme” remedy that “should be implemented only as a last resort and with extreme
caution” and only after consideration of other remedies and discussing less intru-
sive remedies considered by Court of Chancery); see also Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp.,
449 A.2d 232, 240 (Del. 1982) (mandating that involvement of the court and its
custodian in corporation’s affairs and business must be kept to minimum and exer-
cised only so far as justice requires).
178. See id. at 166 (“The Court of Chancery should always consider less drastic
alternatives before authorizing the custodian to sell a solvent company.”).
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Shawe ultimately signals to deadlocked Delaware corporations that the
Court of Chancery’s statutory authority to appoint a custodian and order a
remedy under section 226, while not unfettered, is rather broad.179  This
is consistent with the vast scope of the Court of Chancery’s equitable pow-
ers and the deference it has traditionally been afforded on appeal.180
Nevertheless, the decision warns Delaware corporations of the potential
extremes the court may reach to cure deadlock if the deadlocked factions
fail to privately resolve their issues.181
Depending on the severity of the deadlock, the court may order the
sale of even the most profitable corporation over the objection of its stock-
holders.182  This is foreseeable considering that deadlock provides a
unique framework for the court to intervene.183  Although Delaware cor-
porations enjoy the court’s reluctance to interfere with corporate govern-
ance and decision-making, deadlock may necessitate reliance on the
court’s equitable powers because it is a high sign that the corporation’s
business, stockholders, and employees are at risk.184
B. A Corporate Guide to Divorce: Advice for Corporations and
Their Counsel When Facing Deadlock
After Shawe, corporations and their counsel must seriously consider
the possibility of corporate deadlock and plan accordingly.185  It is wise for
179. See id. at 163–64, 165–67 (“Several sources confirm the Court of Chan-
cery’s broad authority under the statute, which includes ordering a sale.”); id. at
165 (“[O]ur statute provides the Court of Chancery broad authority to address
corporate deadlocks of various kinds, authority that may well affect fundamental
ownership interests”); id. at 163–64 (“This Court has also recognized the broad
authority granted the Court of Chancery under the statute.”); id. at 166 (“[T]he
remedy to address the deadlock is ultimately within the Court of Chancery’s discre-
tion.”); id. at 167 (“The Chancellor was in the best position to assess the viability of
options short of sale.”).
180. See id. at 166 (applying abuse of discretion standard); Gotham Partners,
L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 175 (Del. 2002) (recognizing
that Court of Chancery has wide discretion to fashion remedies and implying that
its discretion deserves great deference); see also Heyman & Lint, supra note 32, at
462–63 (recognizing Court of Chancery’s powers are complete to determine reme-
dies); Massey, supra note 36, at 690 (explaining that Court of Chancery opinions
on corporate law carry great weight and authority).
181. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 167 (noting parties failed to successfully reach
resolution before ordering custodian to sell TPG).
182. See id. (affirming Court of Chancery’s authority to order sale of profita-
ble corporation over objection of stockholder).
183. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 9, § 1:22 (determining that courts may order
remedies as extreme as dissolution of corporation because deadlock can paralyze
corporate operations).
184. See TINNEY, supra note 10, § 1 (emphasizing deadlock’s “crippling effect”
on corporations); Deadlock in A Close Corporation, supra note 50, at 655 (listing nega-
tive effects of deadlock on corporation); LOCKWOOD, supra note 9, § 1:22 (stating
deadlock leads to litigation).
185. See SMITH, supra note 53, at 14 (recognizing that few businesses engage in
advance planning to resolve or decrease likelihood of deadlock and noting that
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corporations and counsel to implement preventative measures to avoid
deadlock from occurring.186  Because lawyers play an active role in plan-
ning and structuring the enterprise, counsel should advise clients to estab-
lish defined methods of settling disputes and of evaluating the rights of
involved parties.187  In addition, counsel should advise corporations to
avoid giving parties equal control and voting rights or, in the alternative,
establish a tie-breaking mechanism.188
If these efforts fail, corporations should proactively design a course of
action in the event deadlock does occur.189  Counsel may advise the cor-
poration to rely on contractual remedies provided by the parties in ad-
vance through the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or stockholders’
agreements.190  The parties may agree in advance that, if deadlock occurs,
there will be a buy-out arrangement, voluntary dissolution, or arbitra-
tion.191  Likewise, courts have recognized corporations’ failures to estab-
lish an “exit strategy” in the event deadlock occurs and the corporation
must be sold.192  Therefore, counsel should advise clients to establish a
method of valuation and sale to ensure that involved parties control the
method of sale to guarantee stockholders recover the value of their
investment.193
Nonetheless, counsel should advise their clients of the benefits and
risks associated with the statutory remedy under section 226.194  In the
wake of Shawe, corporations and counsel must prudently consider the po-
tential financial detriment brought about by corporate deadlock.195  Liti-
optimism at start of business usually obscures belief that deadlock may occur);
Thompson, supra note 39, at 199 (noting that close corporations often fail to ade-
quately plan for deadlock).
186. See SMITH, supra note 53, at 14 (stating corporations should engage in
advance planning).
187. See id. at 14–16 (stating corporations should predetermine methods for
settling disputes and noting important role of counsel).
188. See id. at 14–15 (advocating for avoidance of creating enterprises that
give equal control to their parties).
189. See id. at 14 (stating lawyers should consider techniques for dealing with
deadlock).
190. See TINNEY, supra note 10, § 7 (describing contractual deadlock remedies
integrated into corporate documents or private agreements).
191. See id. §§ 8–10 (discussing buy-out arrangements, voluntary dissolution,
and arbitration).
192. See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 184 n.83 (Valihura, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing parties failed to negotiate exit strategy); Fulk v. Wash. Serv. Assocs., Inc., No.
Civ. A. 17747-NC, 2002 WL 1402273, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2002) (stating parties
never agreed on exit strategy to recover value of investment).
193. See Fulk, 2002 WL 1402273, at *6 (stating parties never agreed on exit
strategy to recover value of investment and implying that they would have deter-
mined fate of corporation’s sale if they had); SMITH, supra note 53, at 15 (necessi-
tating mechanism for evaluation of rights).
194. See SMITH, supra note 53, at 16 (noting lawyers must actively assist and
counsel client in planning corporate enterprise).
195. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 9, § 1:22 (recognizing deadlock leads to costly
litigation).
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gating deadlock issues is far from inexpensive, and misbehavior in the
course of litigation between the deadlocked parties may even result in
sanctions and payment of fees.196
If the corporation does decide to proceed under section 226, counsel
should identify potential risks.197  For example, Shawe warns closely-held
corporations of the ramifications of invoking section 226.198  Close corpo-
rations are put in a bind under the statute because the structure of the
company—which often obliterates the line between stockholders and
management—leaves it vulnerable to courts finding deadlock under both
section 226(a)(1) and section 226(a)(2).199  Therefore, counsel must in-
form clients in this situation that they are greatly exposed to the equitable
powers of the court.200
In addition, counsel should determine whether the deadlock at issue
is as extreme as in Shawe and, therefore, whether the facts will warrant an
extreme remedy.201  If so, counsel must make the corporation aware that
the business may be sold as a going concern or have its assets liquidated
and distributed.202  Ultimately, counsel should make it clear that the court
has broad discretion to choose a remedy, even over objections from stock-
holders or directors.203  Therefore, counsel should encourage clients to
settle the dispute through negotiation and mediation in order to avoid any
unexpected or unwanted outcomes.204
196. See generally Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 142 (Del. 2017) (awarding large
amount of costs and fees to applicant under section 226), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 93
(2017).
197. See SMITH, supra note 53, at 14–15 (noting lawyers must anticipate litiga-
tion issues associated with deadlock).
198. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 155, 161, 167 (describing TPG’s ownership and
control between two stockholders and directors, determining that they were dead-
locked in both capacities, and ordering sale of TPG).
199. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 160–61 (finding deadlock under both section
226(a)(1) and section 226(a)(2)); SMITH, supra note 53, at 64 (stating “closely held
corporations” have few shareholders); TINNEY, supra note 10, § 1 (claiming dissen-
sion and deadlock are peculiar to close corporations).
200. See Shawe, 157 A.3d at 160–61 (implying that Court of Chancery’s ability
to fashion remedy under either provision of section 226 exposed parties to
broader exercise of equitable powers).
201. Cf. id. at 155–59 (cataloging facts and issues that made deadlock in Shawe
so extreme that it warranted sale of TPG).
202. See id. at 166 (noting court had discretion to choose between selling TPG
as going concern or conducting asset sale of its parts).
203. See id. at 165 (proclaiming that Delaware stockholders are subject to
Chancellor’s equitable powers, which include ability to sell corporation over their
objection).
204. Cf. id. at 167 (implying that Court of Chancery would not have ordered
sale of TPG if they had resolved their disputes through negotiation).
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V. FROM BUSINESS PARTNERS TO BROKEN UP: UNDER SECTION 226 THE
COURT HAS THE POWER TO END IT FOR GOOD
Shawe determined that the Court of Chancery has broad authority
under section 226 of the DGCL to resolve deadlock by appointing a custo-
dian and ordering the sale of a solvent corporation.205  The decision reaf-
firmed the Court of Chancery’s broad equitable powers and authority to
fashion remedies on a case-by-case basis.206  Although Shawe was properly
decided, the decision has significant implications for Delaware corpora-
tions facing deadlock.207  Corporations and their counsel must be aware
of the prevalence of deadlock and the risks of invoking section 226.208
Ultimately, Shawe illustrates the dangers of mixing business and pleasure,
demonstrating that the intimate bonds between stockholders and direc-
tors can quickly deteriorate and result in corporate deadlock.209  There-
fore, Delaware corporations’ stockholders and directors must heed Shawe’s
warning: when corporate relationships break up, the Court of Chancery
has the power to end it for good.210
205. See id. at 166 (finding Court of Chancery has broad discretion to choose
deadlock remedy, including ordering sale of solvent corporation).
206. For a discussion of how Shawe affirmed the broad powers of the Court of
Chancery, see supra notes 179–84 and accompanying text.
207. For a discussion of why Shawe was properly decided and its implications
for Delaware corporations, see supra notes 157–84 and accompanying text.
208. For a discussion of how Delaware corporations and counsel should ap-
proach deadlock after Shawe, see supra notes 185–204 and accompanying text.
209. For a discussion of how intimate relationships may negatively impact bus-
iness, see supra notes 2–12 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the deterio-
rated romance that resulted in the Shawe deadlock, see supra notes 89–114 and
accompanying text.
210. For a discussion of why Shawe is a warning for Delaware corporations,
see supra notes 179–84 and accompanying text.
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